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Corporate law understands what constitutional law does not. Minority
status matters to law. Where today's constitutional jurisprudence of equal
protection aspires to colorblindness, corporate law places minority concerns
at the heart of its endeavor. The minorities of corporate law are minority
shareholders-investors holding small, noncontrolling interests in the
corporation. Law's solicitude, it seems, is limited to minority shareholders,
not minority races. Where constitutional law sees only one race-
"American" I-corporate law recognizes minority status as a central datum
for legal decision. At the same time that constitutional law moves to limit
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affirmative action for racial minorities and women,2 corporate law
embraces affirmative action for minority shareholders.3
This Essay examines how two different areas of the law have solved the
question-perhaps the "problem" 4 -of minorities. In so doing, it seeks to
uncover the underlying dynamics of life as a "minority," abstracted from
the context of the corporation and the constitutional realm. By contrasting
corporate and constitutional law, this Essay begins to conceptualize
"minority" status as a legal fact.
Being a member of a minority race is certainly different from being a
minority investor in a corporation. The history of race is inflected with
violence and struggle unparalleled in corporate disputes. But legal scholars
have yet to ask the key question: Do the differences between race and
shareholding justify the radically different approaches to minority status
adopted by corporate and constitutional law? Even more crucially, do the
differences between the two justify a greater solicitude for minority
investors than for minority races? I consider possible differences-namely,
history, a special concern for property rights, the possibility of exit in a
liquid capital market, and the amorphousness of racial discrimination. I
conclude that these differences should lead us to seek a reversal in legal
priorities-stronger protection for minority races than for minority
investors.
The central distinction between the two legal approaches to minorities
can be summarized efficiently as follows: Constitutional law believes that
equality requires blinding oneself to minority status. Corporate law, to the
contrary, believes that equal treatment can only be assured by taking
minority status into account. For corporate law, equality is not sameness.
This Essay responds to the recent "demoralization of the egalitarian
project.",5 I demonstrate how the egalitarian spirit is alive and well-but in
the materialistic world of capital. The current "assault on egalitarianism
' 6
confines itself to seeking to dismantle programs protecting women and
2. See infra notes 282-293 and accompanying text.
3. 1 use the term "affirmative action" in the strongest sense identified by William Van
Alstyne-as minority-mindfulness in decisionmaking resulting in either a preference or a
disproportionate distribution of benefits. See William W. Van Alstyne, Affirmative Actions, 46
WAYNE L. REV. 1517, 1536 (2000).
4. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 1-2 (Modem Library 1996) (1903)
(reporting a query put to African Americans: "How does it feel to be a problem?").
5. Kenneth Arrow et al., Introduction to MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, at ix,
ix (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 2000). In other work, I have sought to revive the egalitarian project
in a number of domains. See Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1012
(2001) [hereinafter Chander, Diaspora Bonds] (discussing an innovative method of raising capital
for developing nations); Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 718-19
(2003) (arguing that cyberlaw scholarship has focused on liberty values to the exclusion of
equality values); Anupam Chander, Whose Republic?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479, 1493-97 (2002)
(book review) (describing the egalitarian possibilities of the Internet).
6. Arrow et al., supra note 5, at xi.
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people of minority races and leaves undisturbed the elaborate legal structure
that protects minority shareholders. This assault is best seen in the Supreme
Court's 1995 decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.7 In that case,
the Court subjected a preference for minority subcontractors to strict
scrutiny, thereby requiring any affirmative action program in favor of
people belonging to minority races to be both justified by a compelling state
interest and narrowly tailored to further that interest. The fact that the race-
based classification was motivated by benign, perhaps even noble, motives
did not itself salvage the use of race.8 The recent Term's decisions in
Grutter v. Bollinger9 and Gratz v. Bollingerl0 confirm that governmental
race consciousness can survive strict scrutiny, yet seem far from embracing
egalitarianism in either rhetoric or substance.
Constitutional law views discrimination against the majority with the
same distaste as discrimination against the minority-requiring strict
scrutiny in either case. Corporate law, on the other hand, routinely intrudes
into the corporation to secure the protection of minority shareholders
against controlling persons within corporations.
A simple thought experiment illustrates my inquiry. Imagine if we ran a
corporation using the rules of constitutional law. Decisions would be
rendered by majority rule of the shareholders (who become "citizens" of the
corporation). This would not mean that the majority could do whatever it
wanted. A constitutional charter, devised at the corporation's founding,
would limit possible actions. Indeed, there would be a guarantee of "equal
protection." But, as I show, this guarantee would be substantially less
protective or demanding than the special duties that corporate law imposes
on the board of the corporation and on any controlling shareholder vis-A-vis
minority shareholders. The governors of the corporation would have no
special duty to ensure that the benefits of their actions did not
disproportionately redound to majority investors. There would be no
ongoing obligation of fair treatment of the minority or duty to work on the
7. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The United States is not alone in its retreat from affirmative action.
The year the Court handed down Adarand, the European Court of Justice ruled that a German law
preferring equally-qualified women over men in occupations in which women were
underrepresented violated a 1976 European Council Directive mandating equal treatment of men
and women. Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, [1995] 1
C.M.L.R. 175 (1995). Some countries, however, enshrine affirmative action in their constitutions.
See, e.g., CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms),
§ 15(2) (permitting the government to carry out any "law, program or activity that has as its object
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups"); INDIA CONST. art. 15, § 3
("Nothing in this article [prohibiting state discrimination] shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for women and children .... for for] any socially and educationally backward
classes .... ); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex, Laws, and Inequality: What India Can Teach
the United States, DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 95.
8. 515 U.S. at 227-29.
9. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
10. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
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minority's behalf. There would be no duty of loyalty that would prevent the
board of directors and the controlling shareholders from exploiting their
power for personal profit at the expense of the minority.
The converse experiment is equally illuminating. Imagine if we ran the
government using the rules of corporate law. Decisions would be rendered
by majority rule, but there would be special protections ensuring that the
process would be fair. On occasion, there might even be such strict
procedures as cumulative voting," which would give minorities a presence
in the governing legislature (including the nearly whites-only Senate).1 2 But
minorities would receive not only procedural rights, but also substantive
rights. Minority citizens would be able to bring a cause of action for
"oppression" when faced with inequitable distributions of social resources.
Most importantly, they would find various legal doctrines-including
derivative suits, freeze-out claims, and fiduciary obligations-that would
seek to ensure their equitable treatment with respect to any transactions
undertaken by the government.
But to say that corporate law approaches minority concerns in the
manner described does not establish that constitutional law should adopt a
similar approach, mutatis mutandis. That is not the goal of this endeavor.
Nor is the goal to suggest that constitutional law should borrow
mechanisms for minority protections from corporate law. Rather, it is to
force a reexamination of constitutional law's great hesitancy to view
information regarding minority status as crucial to administering justice.
At the same time, my goal is to reinterpret corporate law. Values of
fairness and equality turn up in the sharp-elbowed world of business,
exactly where we might least expect to find them. Despite scholarly
commentary to the contrary, the watchwords of corporate law include not
only wealth maximization, but also fairness. Oppression is a cause of action
found not in constitutional law, but in corporate law. Indeed, I show that
much of corporate law can be explained as protective of minority
shareholders. This explanation sheds light on the mystery of what corporate
law is about. Contrary to the law and economics meta-narrative popular
11. Lani Guinier's proposal in this regard earned her the (mis)label "Quota Queen." See Clint
Bolick, Editorial, Clinton's Quota Queens, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at A12. For Guinier's
own work on the subject, see Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious
Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1589 (1993); Lani Guinier, More
Democracy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1; Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for
Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REv. 1413 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, No Two Seats]; and Lani
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral
Success, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 1077 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism].
12. There are currently three nonwhite members of the United States Senate, two of
them from the majority-minority state of Hawaii. See Minorities in the Senate, at
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/minority-senators.htm (last visited
Aug. 30, 2003) (listing all fifteen minority members who have served during the history of
the Senate).
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today,' 3 the shareholder wealth-maximization norm does not suffice as a
complete specification of corporate law. I show that corporate law is
sensitive not only to wealth maximization, but also to wealth distribution.
Rather than leave minority shareholders to the ruthless efficiency of the
marketplace, corporate law steps in to provide mandatory and default
protections for such shareholders. Corporate law's concern for minorities is
evident in its elaborate framework protecting minority interests in the
corporation. The vital mandatory core of corporate law14 shows that the
contractarian victory is incomplete. Even contractarians Easterbrook and
Fischel, in their classic economic explanation of corporate law, find room
for mandatory legal protections for minority capitalists. 15 Contractarians
might have preferred to leave investors to negotiate protections for
themselves, with investors denying corporations capital unless sufficient
contractual safeguards were in place. But this is not the approach of current
corporate law. In fact, minority investors need not rely entirely on their own
well-struck bargains to protect themselves from unfair exploitation by
dominant shareholders or self-dealing management. 
16
Minority shareholder protection is a central part of the corporate
governance model that American scholars seek to export to transitional and
developing economies.17 Indeed, one of the most famous claims in the field
of comparative corporate governance is that the protection of minority
investors-both minority shareholders and outside creditors-offers the
"legal DNA of good economies."1 8 According to this claim, minority
13. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) ("Shareholder wealth maximization is
usually accepted as the appropriate goal of American business circles."). See generally Lynn A.
Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002)
(assessing arguments for the shareholder wealth-maximization norm).
14. For an authoritative definition of this core, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1618 (1989).
15. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 22-35 (1991) (describing reasons for trumping corporate contracts).
16. This does not mean that minority shareholders can be complacent. See Park McGinty, The
Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic
Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 170-80 (1997); see also Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366,
1380 (Del. 1993) (en banc) ("It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our
corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-imposed stockholder
buy-out for which the parties had not contracted."); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1091 (Or.
1977) (declining to enjoin a sale of corporate stock where the minority investor had failed to
protect himself by contract).
17. For example, we are told that Russia has failed recently both in ensuring minority
shareholder protection and in creating a culture of respect for the rule of law. See, e.g., Bernard
Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1731 (2000).
18. Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3,
4 (2000) ("Corporate governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside
investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders."); see also David Wessel, The
Legal DNA of Good Economies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2001, at I (further describing the La Porta
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investor protection is one of the keys to the American success story 19 and is
the future of corporate law worldwide.2 °
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I reread the canon of
corporate law. While the economic reading of corporate law doctrines finds
in them a concern for efficiency, my review reveals a simultaneous
commitment to minority protection and egalitarianism. I identify a theory of
power that underlies much of corporate law and that speaks to
constitutional debates. I suggest that corporate law is more than a device "to
reduce the transaction costs of private bargaining by providing a code of
standard legal arrangements.,, 21 As crafted over the centuries by judges and
legislators, corporate law is also a device to ensure that minorities will be
treated fairly, even without a-showing that they would have bargained for
contractual safeguards in the absence of transaction costs. Although
contractarian scholars have recently advocated lifting such protections, the
Enron and WorldCom debacles have begun to turn the tide toward stronger,
not weaker, protection.
22
Part II considers whether the analogy between minority shareholders
and minority races holds. I move from the question in Part I-what does
corporate law do?-to the question, why does it do it? I argue that the
justifications for corporate law's active intercession on behalf of minorities
also pertain to the constitutional realms of education and employment. I
locate corporate law's concern for minorities in a desire to promote capital
formation as well as to ensure fairness. These goals should also animate our
constitutional jurisprudence. "But race and shareholding are different!"
many will protest. Accordingly, I consider the claim that differences
between the two classes of minorities justify the different approaches taken
toward them. I then examine what corporate law might teach us about how
to define the classes of minorities relevant to legal decisionmaking.
Part III applies the theoretical arguments offered in the paper to three
contemporary civil rights debates centered on affirmative action. I consider
first the question of affirmative action in higher education, an issue recently
research). Their claim is not without controversy. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History:
The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U.
L. REV. 641, 653 (1999) (identifying the constraints on convergence in corporate governance).
19. See La Porta et al., supra note 18, at 18-22; Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106
J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1127-33 (1998).
20. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1761 (2002).
21. RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 1 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255, 1263
(Cal. 2003) (observing that "[t]o open the newspaper today is to receive a daily dose of scandal,
from Adelphia to Enron and beyond" and permitting a state law action for securities fraud where
the shareholder held stock in reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 113: 119
Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise
addressed by the Supreme Court in Grutter and Gratz.23 Drawing upon
theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of discrimination, I
show that the reasons why law protects minority shareholders are also the
reasons why law should sometimes promote affirmative action for minority
races. Next, I analyze a new state constitutional initiative in California-
being put to a vote as this publication goes to press-that promises to be as
divisive as Proposition 209. This new initiative, which I call the "Racial
,,24Blindness Initiative, would prevent the government from collecting
information about race, thus carrying the concept of colorblindness to its
logical conclusion. Finally, I preview the coming demographic shift-
already reality in California-that will make minority races a majority of
the population. The advent of this majority-minority configuration will lead
many to question the need for affirmative action.
I. REREADING THE CANON
Consider the canonical case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,25 which has
been interpreted as a classic statement of the norm of wealth
maximization.26  Exercising absolute control over the company he
founded,27 Henry Ford refused to increase the stockholders' dividends,
preferring instead to reinvest the capital in the business. The Dodge
brothers, then shareholders in Ford Motor, were piqued by his refusal to
issue a dividend and sued. While the court declined to interfere with the
proposed expansion, it held that Henry Ford's professed desire to benefit
the public violated his obligation to his shareholders.28
The case has come to stand for the proposition that directors must
manage a corporation so as to maximize the wealth of shareholders.2 9 But
this seems an odd reading given that Henry Ford himself was the largest
shareholder of the Ford Motor Company, with over half of the company's
23. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
24. While described by its proponents as a "Racial Privacy Initiative," the initiative does little
to protect privacy-after all, governmental forms inquiring about racial information often permit
the individual to refuse to divulge such information, so someone desiring to protect her privacy
can generally do so now. The initiative is better characterized as a blindness proposition because it
forces governmental ignorance of racial information.
25. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
26. Shareholder wealth maximization remains corporate law's norm, at least in principle. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1423-24 (1993) (observing that "the mainstream
of corporate law remains committed to the principles espoused by the Dodge court"). But cf
D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998) (arguing that the
shareholder primacy norm has little effect on corporate decisionmaking).
27. 170 N.W. at 671 (noting that the "policy of the board of directors has been dominated and
controlled absolutely by Henry Ford").
28. Id. at 684-85.
29. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 16.2, at 678-79 (1986).
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stock in his name. 30 The court did not worry that Henry Ford was not
maximizing his personal earnings. Rather, its concern was with Henry
Ford's minority co-owners; any effect on Henry Ford's own finances was
incidental. The court held not that insiders must simply maximize
shareholder wealth, but that they must do so equitably.31 The court made its
underlying concern for minority shareholders quite plain: "There should be
no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties which Mr. Ford
conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the
duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to protesting, minority
stockholders. 32
Indeed, as this Part demonstrates, minority shareholder protection is at
the heart of the corporate law enterprise. I do not offer this as a new
observation. Adolf Berle, Jr. recognized it half a century ago: The rules of
corporate law, he wrote, "were and still are directed primarily toward the
protection of the property interests of minority stockholders., 33 But despite
its long provenance, this fundamental value has often been obscured by the
focus on shareholder wealth maximization-a focus that omits the special
attention that corporate law pays to a certain type of shareholder.
While there is a strong majoritarian character to corporate law,34 that
should not obscure the affirmative steps that corporate law takes to protect
minority shareholders. The key distinction is that, while majoritarian
devices in corporate governance require nonintervention on the part of
30. The court described Henry Ford as "the president of the company, who owns and for
several years has owned 58 per cent. of the entire capital stock of the company." Dodge, 170
N.W. at 671.
31. The concern for equitable distribution can be understood as purely instrumental to the
goal of wealth maximization, because inequities in distribution might impact the ability of
corporations to raise capital in the future. See infra Subsection II.B.2. One scholar has suggested
that corporate law is indifferent to distributional issues among asset classes in the corporation. See
Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of
Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 248-57 (1999). Smith's argument focuses, however, not
on distributional issues among shareholders, but on distributional issues between shareholders and
bondholders. Therefore, his claim is generally inapposite to mine. Even between shareholders and
bondholders, however, the Delaware Suprerhe Court had previously given Revlon's noteholders
short shrift in favor of the company's equityholders, thus undermining Smith's claim. See Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). Smith does note that
courts have sanctioned recapitalizations that favor common stockholders over preferred
stockholders, Smith, supra, at 255-56, but any preference given to common stockholders seems
consistent with my claim that courts are especially concerned with the lot of minority
shareholders.
32. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 (emphasis added). This sentence is omitted from the usual
citations to the case, which only quote the sentence that immediately follows this one: "A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders." Id.
33. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1958).
34. The American Law Institute has gone so far as to characterize American corporate law as
a "largely unqualified system of majoritarian control." 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS pt. 7, ch. 4 introductory note (1994)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. Yet the ALl carefully observes that
"unless counterbalanced, majoritarian control also creates a potential risk for many investors." Id.
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legislators and judges, minority protection devices require active vigilance.
Corporate law springs into action-becomes nontrivial 35-on behalf of
minority shareholders.
Such special attention should not be mistaken for effective minority
control. The debacles of Enron, WorldCom, and others demonstrate that
despite the protective stance of corporate law, minority investors may yet
be imperiled by the manipulations of controlling persons. Moreover,
minority shareholder protection generally does not empower the minority to
make decisions for the corporation.36 The business judgment rule, in
particular, operates to insulate most corporate decisions from judicial
review, at least in the absence of fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest.
37
This is not to say that minority shareholder protection operates only
occasionally, intervening in extreme cases. Rather, it is omnipresent-
structuring mergers, regulating securities offerings, and guiding deliberative
processes. Due consideration of minority interests is an ordinary part of
corporate life, mandated by law.
Moreover, shareholder democracy does not permit the majority to set
company policy directly. Shareholder resolutions are merely suggestions to
the board of directors, and attempts to control the directors by majority vote
will be rebuffed: "The directors are not servants to obey directions and
orders given them by majority shareholders., 38 Directors must serve all
shareholders, not just those wielding majority power: "[T]he management
and control of the company are entrusted to the directors for the benefit and
protection of all the shareholders. 39 Indeed, this may help explain why we
have boards of directors in the first place. The board, which is responsible
to all shareholders, not just to those who elected them, insulates
management from the direct command of controlling shareholders.4n
35. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990).
36. See S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919). But see Julihn Javier Garza,
Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders-A Comparative Study, 31
ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 617 (2000) (highlighting the "power of the minority" within the
corporation).
37. 2 F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
§ 10:04 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 2003); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule:
Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 291 (1994).
38. HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 122 (1946).
39. Id.
40. Morten Bennedsen, Why Do Firms Have Boards? (SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper
No. 303,680, 2002), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid
= 3 0 3 6 8 0 (concluding on
the basis of an empirical study of Danish firms that boards are used in closely held corporations to
protect noncontrolling shareholders from exploitation by controlling shareholders). But see
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing that decisionmaking is entrusted to a board rather than
individual officers because of the likely superiority of group decisionmaking over individual
decisionmaking); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate
Board of Directors (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that boards of
directors originally served as symbols of the consent of the governed).
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A potential confusion in corporate law stems from the use of the terms
"shareholder" and "stockholder" to refer to minority shareholders.
Oftentimes, these terms are used to refer to the shareholders who do not
control the corporation-that is, "minority shareholders." When Berle and
Means, for example, describe the lack of control of the "stockholder" in the
modem corporation they mean stockholders other than controlling
stockholders. 41 They thus emphasize that lack of control is the usual
position of the stockholder in the modem corporation. In such a
corporation, every shareholder is a minority shareholder. Even though they
recognize that this is only a dominant trend, not a characteristic of all
corporations, 42 they still employ "stockholder" or "shareholder" as
shorthand for "minority shareholder."
To combat such confusion, three clarifications of my own are in order
here. First, by "minority shareholders," I mean noncontrolling shareholders.
In many corporations such minority shareholders may together hold a
majority of the shares-but only rarely if ever act in concert to exercise
their potential voting power. It follows that controlling shareholders can
hold a minority of shares yet exercise control, a seeming paradox that
corporate law has long understood.43 Second, I do not mean to suggest that
corporate law's concern is exclusively with minority shareholders. There
are certainly other constituencies that corporate law serves, including
creditors (through doctrines such as fraudulent transfer and veil piercing)
and perhaps also employees and the community. Finally, corporate law's
rise to the defense of the powerless is, of course, woefully incomplete;
corporate law does not serve workers, consumers, or the community with
nearly the same enthusiasm it offers to minority shareholders. Indeed,
Henry Ford's ostensible effort to the contrary was rebuffed by the court.
But among the shareholding constituency alone, this Part reveals that
minority shareholder protection, explicitly and implicitly, animates much of
corporate law.
I continue here my rereading of the corporate law canon.
41. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 66-116 (rev. ed. 1967) [hereinafter BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION 1967]; id. at 83 ("[T]he usual stockholder has little power over the affairs of the
enterprise and his vote.., is rarely capable of being used as an instrument of democratic
control .... The bulk of owners have in fact almost no control over the enterprise."); ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 278-
79 (1932) [hereinafter BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 1932]; id. at 338 ("The
stockholder has surrendered control over his wealth.").
42. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 1967, supra note 41, at 116 (showing
that more than forty percent of the 200 largest corporations had controlling shareholders).
43. See infra notes 262-268 and accompanying text.
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A. Cases
Dodge v. Ford is not unique. Contemporary readings of the prominent
corporate law cases have often elided their central concern with minority
protection. I analyze here three familiar cases, chosen not because of some
unusual sympathy for minorities, but because they show that such sympathy
animates even the foundational cases.
1. Perlman v. Feldmann and Control Premia
Set in the backdrop of the Korean War, the case of Perlman v.
Feldmann44 demonstrates the high standards that courts impose on
controlling shareholders to protect the rights of minority shareholders.
Taking advantage of the steel shortage resulting from the war, C. Russell
Feldmann, the dominant shareholder 45 of the Newport Steel Company (and
also its chairman and president), sold his control block to a group of steel
buyers "who were interested in securing a source of supply in a market
becoming ever tighter.'A6 Minority shareholder Perlman brought a
derivative action seeking to force Feldmann to share the part of his sale
proceeds attributable to the sale of corporate control, including the power to
determine the allocation of the corporation's steel among potential buyers.
The Second Circuit sided with the minority plaintiff. It held that
Feldmann had failed to meet that "high standard... which we and other
courts have come to expect and demand of corporate fiduciaries ' '47 because
he had sought to appropriate for himself the market advantage that
belonged to the corporation as a whole.48
While the case has been criticized as reflecting an "equal opportunity"
approach to the division of the premium appurtenant to a sale of control,49 it
seems better understood exactly on the terms stated in Judge Clark's
opinion for the court: "[I]n a time of market shortage, where a call on a
corporation's product commands an unusually large premium, ... a
44. 219 F.2d 173 (2dCir. 1955).
45. Though Feldmann did not own a majority of shares, the court recognized that he had
"working control" of the corporation. Id. at 174 n.1; see also id. at 178 (Swan, J., dissenting). In
Sections II.D and III.C, I highlight corporate law's sophisticated understanding of control even in
the absence of majority ownership.
46. Id. at 175.
47. Id. at 176.
48. The court even invoked then-Chief Judge Cardozo's demanding duty of the finest loyalty.
See id. (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)).
49. See Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1465, 1475 (1992) (observing that "many commentators have concluded that the case's
natural implication was that the duty to share the control premium should apply in all cases"). But
see William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
HARV. L. REv. 505, 506 (1965) (arguing that the sale of control by a controlling shareholder is a
corporate opportunity to which all shareholders are entitled).
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fiduciary may not appropriate to himself the value of this premium."5° The
purchasers of the controlling stake in the company bought control in order
to guarantee themselves a supply of steel during wartime. For this, the
purchasers can themselves be castigated for violating their duty of loyalty
to the corporation by not allocating the corporate product in accordance
solely with the interests of the corporation. 5' Feldmann's wrongdoing was
in countenancing this exploitation.
5 2
My interest in the case is in why the court intervened. Who was harmed
by the arrangement? Feldmann, of course, was quite happy with it, as were
the new controlling shareholders of the corporation. At the same time,
future holders of corporate stock would be indifferent; they would
presumably purchase the stock with full knowledge of the identity of the
controlling shareholders and the likely effect of those shareholders' actions
on corporate profits. Employees would seem largely unaffected by the
change, and might even benefit from the additional security of always
selling to a single buyer-namely, the acquiring company.
Perhaps it might be offered that the corporation itself was harmed-its
value as a whole diminished by its capture by one buyer. But a harm to the
abstract entity of the corporation seems an inadequate basis upon which to
justify judicial intervention. Rather, it is clear that the harm done was to
minority shareholders such as Perlman. As the court noted, its concern was
with Feldmann's "coventurers. ' ' 53 The court underlined this concern in its
remedy: The recovery, it commanded, should go to the minority
shareholder plaintiffs instead of the corporation as a whole, because a
recovery by the corporation would be shared with the controlling
shareholder.54
50. 219 F.2d at 178. But see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 717-18 (1982) (arguing that the purchasers of the controlling
stake did not appropriate any value that properly belonged to the corporation).
51. See Andrews, supra note 49; see also Alfred Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70
HARv. L. REv. 986, 1019-20 (1957) (applying the "fiduciary principle to find that old managers
were themselves guilty of a breach of trust if they knowingly turned control over to [exploitative]
buyers").
52. Perlman has often been characterized as a "looting" case. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth,
Derivative Suits and Pro Rata Recovery, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1274, 1281 (1993) ("[lI]t seems
clear that the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs because it concluded that under the
circumstances the premium probably derived from the opportunity to loot Newport later. If the
premium had arisen because of additional value perceived by the buyers, there would have been
no damage to the remaining shareholders.").
53. 219 F.2d at 178; see also Booth, supra note 52, at 1281 ("The reason given by the Second
Circuit for the remedy was that the premium was at the expense of the outside shareholders.").
54. 219 F.2d at 178.
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Perlman v. Feldmann is a controversial case;55 recent cases on control
premia have tended to go the other way.56 But even contemporary cases on
control premia show a marked concern for minority rights.57 In a recent
ruling in favor of a controlling shareholder group, for example, the
Delaware Chancery Court first reviewed and dismissed any "threat of
exploitation or even unfairness towards a vulnerable minority that might
arguably justify discrimination against a controlling block of stock., 58 The
actions of controlling shareholder are scrutinized carefully to reveal any
impermissible unfairness to the minority.
I begin with the case of the sale of a controlling block because it is here
that the law might be said to put stress on my thesis. 59 After all, the law
generally permits the controlling shareholder to sell her shares at a "control
premium. '' 60 In so doing, the law recognizes and validates the extra value of
control. But it does so on behalf of the minority. The case for the unequal
distribution of the control premium turns on the question, which rule makes
minority shareholders better off?
61
55. See I O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 37, § 4:07 ("The Perlman... opinion[], though
widely discussed by commentators, ha[s] not been widely followed."). Perlman remains,
however, a fixture in corporate law casebooks. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1019 (5th ed. 2000); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 529 (concise 8th ed. 2000); ROBERT W. HAMILTON,
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 591 (7th ed. 2001); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS-CASES
AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 683 (4th ed. 2000).
56. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware
Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359,
381 (1996) (observing that "there remains considerable doubt that Perlman would be followed
today"); RONALD J. GILSON & JEFFREY N. GORDON, CONTROLLING CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDERS II (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 228,
Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 262, 2003),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cffm?abstractid=417181.
57. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471-74 (Cal. 1969) (holding that
majority shareholders, who exchanged controlling shares for personal gain, owed a fiduciary duty
to minority shareholders to act fairly, justly, and equitably).
58. Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 304 (Del. Ch. 1994).
59. An interesting counterpoint is the use of "tag-along" rights granted to minority investors
in the Novo Mercado in Brazil. These rights guarantee minority investors an equal opportunity to
sell upon a change of control and a proportionate share of the control premium. See Coffee, supra
note 20, at 1807; Craig Karmin & Jonathan Karp, Brazilian Market Tries Friendly Approach:
Novo Mercado 's Rules Aim To Help Minority Holders, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2001, at CI.
60. See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988) (permitting a controlling
shareholder to dispose, under certain circumstances, of her shares at a premium without requiring
the same price to be made available to minority shareholders), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 34, § 5.16. At the same time, however, various legal provisions disfavor a control premium.
See Coffee, supra note 56, at 371-401.
61. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 55, at 1019; ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 11.4.5
(1986); William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares,
78 HARV. L. REV. 505, 517-19, 522-28 (1965); Berle, supra note 33, at 1214; Hill, supra note 51,
at 1010-28; see also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 56, at 12 (evaluating the ideal regulation of
control premia from the perspective of minority shareholders).
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Corporate law here enshrines a Rawlsian egalitarianism: 62 Inequality is
permissible, but only because it benefits the least well off. The premium
exacted upon transfer of control redounds ultimately to the benefit of the
minority shareholders, absent exploitation of the private benefits of control
that fiduciary duties seek to check. The shareholder wealth maximization
norm, we see, does not completely capture the concerns of corporate law.
2. Joy v. North and Power Within the Corporation
Luminously written, the case of Joy v. North offers a sophisticated
understanding of relations within the corporate power structure.63 Whereas
Perlman v. Feldmann involves judicial scrutiny of a controlling shareholder
for compliance with fiduciary duties, Joy v. North involves judicial scrutiny
of a corporate board, again for compliance with fiduciary duties. In careful
language, Judge Winter's opinion for the Second Circuit in Joy v. North
justifies its intrusion into corporate affairs.
Minority shareholder Doris Joy sued the directors and officers of
Citytrust, Inc. for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty. Joy complained that
Citytrust had extended financing to real estate development company Katz
Corporation without regard for the merits of the loans. Citytrust had done
so while the son of its CEO, Nelson North, was employed by Katz.64 After
Joy initiated suit, Citytrust's board of directors established a "Special
Litigation Committee" of two new board members. After study, the
Committee recommended discontinuing the suit with respect to the bulk of
the defendant directors.65 Disinclined to defer to the Committee's judgment,
the Second Circuit (which was acting in prediction of Connecticut law)
reviewed the likelihood of success in the litigation as well as the size of any
likely award. Weighing these factors against the costs of the litigation, the
court concluded that litigation was clearly warranted.
Joy v. North can be understood simply as the natural working out of the
principle of shareholder wealth maximization. The court intervened to
permit a shareholder to sue where the board of directors had plainly
derogated from its responsibility to maximize corporate returns. While not
disagreeing with this reading of Joy, I suggest that Joy can only be
understood as a case dissecting power relations, even if such dissection is in
the service of shareholder wealth. The court's decision to intervene, over
62. Rawls accepts inequalities where the improvement in fortunes of those at the top
simultaneously benefits those at the bottom. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 68 (rev. ed.
1999) ("What... can possibly justify this kind of initial inequality in life prospects? According to
the difference principle, it is justifiable only if the difference in expectation is to the advantage of
the representative man who is worse off, in this case the representative unskilled worker.").
63. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
64. Id. at 894.
65. Id. at 883-84.
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the dissent's objection of "overregulation, '66 resulted from the court's
concern with power relations in the corporate sphere.
The court was concerned about the absence of power in the shareholder
class. Apparently without a controlling shareholder,67 Citytrust lay at the
mercy of its management. Citytrust thus represented the classic Berle-
Means corporation, with a dispersed multitude of public investors and a
professional management. 68 In such a corporation, shareholders, each with a
small stake in the enterprise, would lack the financial incentive to watch
over the enterprise or to intervene in cases of managerial failure or abuse.
Control, according to Berle and Means, would therefore rest in the
professional management.69 In the absence of a controlling shareholder,
every shareholder becomes a minority shareholder, requiring judicial
solicitude.
The separation of ownership and control in the modem public
corporation implied a need for the state to protect minority shareholders
from the "rapaciousness of corporate managers. 7 ° In contemporary terms,
shareholder powerlessness might be explained in terms of "rational
apathy., 71 Shareholder powerlessness is itself rational. The empowered
shareholder, who takes upon herself the entire cost of direct action with
only the promise of a proportional share of any award, acts contrary to her
own interest and allows others to free-ride on her efforts. Because of
rational limits on shareholder monitoring, the likelihood of abuse by
controlling directors and officers grows.
This seems to be borne out in the case of Citytrust. The challenged
transactions-the loans to Katz, each new one compounding the error of the
previous ones--occurred over years under the supervision of Citytrust's
management. There is a strong suggestion that management exploited its
control for private benefits, with the son of the chief executive profiting
from the loans extended by Citytrust.
72
66. Id. at 898 (Cardamone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. The lack of a controlling shareholder is implicit in the court's reference to the rationale
for the derivative suit lying in a dispersed ownership structure, id. at 886-87, and in the absence of
any reference to any controlling shareholder or shareholder group.
68. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 1932, supra note 41, at 278-79; see
also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (arguing that control of many American corporations has passed into
the hands of a professional class).
69. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 1932, supra note 41, at 278-79.
70. 9 ZOLMAN CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 108.01 n.3
(2003) (concluding that, because of the separation of ownership and control in many public
corporations, "[c]orporate law.., must shield shareholders from the rapaciousness of corporate
managers").
71. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 55, at 544-46.
72. Joy, 692 F.2d at 894.
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The backbone of shareholder power, derivative suits can be understood
as grounded in minority shareholder protection.73 Given the separation of
ownership and control, minority shareholders needed a way to call directors
to account. Justice Jackson described derivative suits as a "remedy born of
stockholder helplessness, '74 such helplessness resulting from the fact that
stockholders were "numerous and scattered" and held but "small
interests. 75 Derivative suits would be unnecessary to protect the interests of
controlling shareholders, who, almost by definition, are likely to hold a
large enough stake in the corporation to justify the cost of monitoring
against managerial wrongdoing.76 Not only do controlling shareholders
have the incentive to act, but they also have the power: As the Illinois
Supreme Court has observed, "[A] majority or controlling shareholder can
usually persuade the corporation to sue in its own name. 77
The Berle-Means hypothesis explains why corporate law favors
minorities-and why the Second Circuit intervened in Joy v. North. Left to
themselves, minorities are presumed to be without adequate power or
incentive to prevent abuse.78 To echo the words of the Second Circuit,
"[T]he stake of each shareholder.., is usually too small.., and the costs
of organizing.., are usually prohibitively high. 79
73. BALLANTINE, supra note 38, at 334 ("Such suits are the principal remedy by which
defrauded minority shareholders may call directors, officers, promoters and controlling
shareholders to account .. "); Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders 'Derivative Suit: Notes on Its
Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 994 (1957) (observing that, at its origins, the derivative action
"may be viewed as another application of the political principle of protection for minorities").
That derivative suits protect minority shareholders is further demonstrated by the fact that most
jurisdictions do not condition a derivative suit on the minority shareholder plaintiffs making a
demand on all shareholders. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:02 (2002) (concluding that "[flew recent cases ultimately require demand
on shareholders"). Even states that require demand on shareholders excuse it where it would be
futile because "a majority of the stock was owned or controlled by alleged wrongdoers
antagonistic to the suit." Id. § 5:04.
74. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
75. Id. at 547.
76. This is well accepted even by prominent contractarians. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler &
Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65
WASH. L. REV. 1, 24 n.97 (1990).
77. Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230, 232-33 (I1. 1988); see also Mary Elizabeth Matthews,
Derivative Suits and the Similarly Situated Shareholder Requirement, 8 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1, 12
(1995) (observing that "[t]he majority through their control of the board could cause the suit to be
brought directly").
78. But, as in any instantiation of power, the power granted to minorities to bring suit on
behalf of the corporation can be abused. After an empirical study of shareholder suits against
public corporations, Roberta Romano concludes that "the principal beneficiaries... appear to be
attorneys." Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 55, 84 (1991). State legislatures have accordingly placed stringent requirements on
derivative actions to assure that suits are well-founded. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West
2003); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2003); see also Cohen, 337 U.S. 541 (upholding,
against due process and equal protection challenges, a New Jersey statute requiring shareholders
with very small holdings to post bond before bringing a derivative claim).
79. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1982).
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The court considered not only power relations between shareholders
and managers, but also relations within the management itself. Though the
possible conflict of interest in the Katz transactions was limited to CEO
North, that did not acquit the remaining directors of the conflict. Nelson
North, the court tells us, "completely dominated" the management of the
company.80 Though North had recused himself from voting on the Katz
transactions, the court dismissed this as a kind of false propriety: "[North's]
fastidiousness appears to have been limited to the formality of voting, for
the Report [of the Special Litigation Committee] strongly suggests that
North was deeply involved in the Katz transactions .. . ."81
The court also refused to defer to the judgment of the independent
directors appointed to the Special Litigation Committee. 82 The court
doubted their objectivity, noting that they were appointed by the defendants
themselves. The court explained, "It is not cynical to expect that such
committees will tend to view derivative actions against the other directors
with skepticism." 84 The court worried that deferring to the Committee's
assessment would preclude shareholders from enforcing their rights.85
As we have seen, the Second Circuit's assessment in Joy v. North of the
workings of the corporate power structure led to its conclusion that
intervention is necessary to protect shareholders who would otherwise be
vulnerable. 86 Such examination of the underlying power relations is well-
precedented in corporate law. For example, in Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica
Gas & Electric, Co.,87 then-Judge Cardozo famously "probe[d] beneath the
surface ' 88 of corporate relations, recognizing that "[a] dominating influence
may be exerted in other ways than by a vote. 8 9
80. Id. at 894. The court went on to describe some of the mechanisms by which North
dominated the board, including not distributing agendas or materials before board meetings. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. Decisions of special litigation committees appointed in corporations with controlling
shareholders also require great scrutiny. See Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 326 (N.C. 1987).
83. Joy, 692 F.2d at 888.
84. Id.; cf Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner,
J.) ("The so-called outsiders.., are often friends of the insiders."), revd on other grounds, 481
U.S. 69 (1987).
85. Joy, 692 F.2d at 889 ("The traditional fiduciary obligations of directors and officers under
Connecticut law can hardly be said to exist if the sole enforcement method can be eliminated on a
recommendation of the defendants' appointees."). Deference to a special litigation committee
would work especially to the disadvantage of minority shareholders in the context of a corporation
with a controlling shareholder, as the case ofAlford v. Shaw makes plain. 358 S.E.2d at 326.
86. Joy, 692 F.2d at 889 (stating that a contrary "view essentially vests power in defendant's
appointees to bring about their dismissal").
87. 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918).
88. Id. at 379.
89. Id. at 379-80.
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3. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings and Fairness in
Control Transactions
The "battle for corporate control" 90 over Revlon turned on the legality
of the efforts of the Revlon board to thwart a hostile takeover by favoring a
"white knight." 9' The hostile bidder challenged the board's favoritism
toward its preferred acquirer as contrary to the board's obligations to the
company's shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court sided with the
hostile bidder. When the sale of the company became "inevitable,, 92 the
court declared, "[t]he directors' role changed from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company. 93 With the sale of the company
certain, the battle for corporate control must be won on the basis of the best
value for shareholders.94
The court's concern for shareholders is apparent.95 By preferring the
inferior offer of the white knight, Revlon's board failed to maximize the
price the shareholders would receive for their stock. This failure, the court
held, violated the board's fiduciary duties of loyalty and care owed to the
shareholders.96
While Revlon's support for shareholders as a class is evident, its role in
protecting minority shareholders specifically becomes manifest only in
subsequent cases. Indeed, minority shareholders offer a key to
understanding Delaware's complex case law on takeover defenses. Under
that case law, courts at times intervene to block a board's defenses, and at
other times sit idly on the sidelines. Commentators have long sought to find
coherence in this jurisprudence, suggesting, for example, that it can be
explained on the ground that directors should make all business decisions
90. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 175 (Del. 1986).
91. Id. at 184.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 182.
94. Later cases have clarified that auctions are not the only means by which a board can
assure that it is obtaining the best value for shareholders. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera &
Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 68 (Del. 1989); Barkan v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 567 A.2d 1279,
1286-87 (Del. 1989); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del. 1989)
("Directors are not required by Delaware law to conduct an auction according to some standard
formula ... ").
95. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain
Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521, 527 (2002) (describing Revlon's affirmation of
"shareholder primacy"). My point here is to observe the court's concern for shareholders, not to
argue for the wisdom of its judgment. John Coffee has argued that a hostile takeover may
ultimately prove detrimental to shareholders because it may be motivated by considerations other
than efficiencies. John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1153
(1984).
96. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
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subject only to shareholder removal 97 or that directors best understand the
true value of a corporation.98 I propose here that whether courts intervene
turns in large part on how minority shareholders will fare under the board's
plan.99
Judicial concern for minority shareholders during a change of control
was clarified in the case of Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC
Network. 00 Paramount, which had earlier been the unwelcome bidder for
Time, 01 now found itself the subject of unfriendly advances from QVC.
Before QVC made its overtures, Paramount's board had been planning a
merger with Viacom. QVC's interest led the Paramount board to take some
defensive steps that would make the planned Viacom merger difficult to
dislodge. QVC sued, arguing that the Paramount board violated its fiduciary
obligations. While the Delaware Supreme Court had approved the Time
board's proposed merger with Warner Communications in the face of
Paramount's hostile bid,' °2 the court now recoiled from affirming the
Paramount board's proposed merger with Viacom in the face of QVC's
hostile bid.
The difference between the decisions in Time and QVC has been
explained by the effect of the merger on control in the corporation. But
closer examination reveals that control is at issue only to the extent that it
implies risk to minority shareholders. The court distinguished the proposed
Time-Warner merger (which it approved) and the proposed Paramount-
Viacom merger (which it did not approve) as follows: "Time would be
owned by a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders both before and
after the merger," 10 3 whereas the Paramount-Viacom merger would "shift
control of Paramount from the public stockholders to a controlling
stockholder, Viacom."' 0 4 That is, in the case of Time-Warner, control
would remain where it lay-in the anonymous stock market-while in
Paramount-Viacom, control would shift from the market to Viacom, and
97. See Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover
Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994).
98. See Black & Kraakman, supra note 95, at 521.
99. A student note reaches a similar conclusion, as does an article by two scholars. See
Kimble C. Cannon & Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority Shareholder Rights Under
Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants and Maximizing Long-Term
Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 725, 773 ("QVC is
really a case about the protection of minority shareholders in that Vice Chancellor Jacobs
recognized that the shareholders of Paramount form a constructive minority and invoked Revlon
to protect that constructive minority."); Alexander B. Johnson, Note, Is Revlon Only Cosmetic?:
Structuring a Merger in the Mid-1990s, 63 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2271, 2313 (1995) ("Revlon duties
arise largely to protect minority shareholders when control is transferred from them.").
100. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
101. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
102. Id. at 1154-55.
103. QVC, 637 A.2d at 46.
104. Id. at 48.
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within Viacom to a particular person, Sumner Redstone, Viacom's
controlling shareholder. Indeed, Redstone would become the "controlling
stockholder of the combined company." 05
But what is it about a change in control that spurs the court to action?
The concern is that shareholders, who earlier were more or less equal,
would now become minority shareholders in an enterprise controlled by
someone else. And, as minority shareholders, they might face exploitation,
as the court explained:
In the absence of devices protecting the minority stockholders,
stockholder votes are likely to become mere formalities where there
is a majority stockholder. For example, minority stockholders can
be deprived of a continuing equity interest in their corporation by
means of a cash-out merger. Absent effective protective provisions,
minority stockholders must rely for protection solely on the
fiduciary duties owed to them by the directors and the majority
stockholder, since the minority stockholders have lost the power to
influence corporate direction through the ballot. 1
06
The key distinction between Time and QVC seems to be that in Time,
"'effectuation of the merger would not have subjected Time shareholders to
the risks and consequences of holders of minority shares."'' °7 That is, the
Paramount merger would have put that company's shareholders at the
mercy of a controlling shareholder. The court acted because of its concern
for the minority shareholder in the presence of a controlling shareholder.
In so doing, the Delaware Supreme Court continued the long tradition
of vigilance in the face of controlling shareholders. The common law
has long imposed special fiduciary obligations on controlling
shareholders--obligations that minority shareholders do not share. The
Supreme Court's well-cited dictum in Pepper v. Litton stands as a
prominent example: "A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or
controlling stockholder or group of stockholders."' 0 8 Indeed, many of the
standard corporate law cases turn on the special responsibilities of
controlling shareholders. In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, for example, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the parent corporation of a majority-
105. Id. at 38.
106. Id. at 42-43 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (footnote
omitted)).
107. Id. at 47 (quoting Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670 &
10935, 1989 WL 79880, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 1[4], 1989) (Allen, C.)).
108. 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (citation omitted); see also S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S.
483, 487-88 (1919) ("The rule of corporation law and of equity invoked is well settled and has
been often applied. The majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a
fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself or its officers and
directors.").
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owned subsidiary had violated its fiduciary obligation as a controlling
shareholder by using its power to cause the subsidiary to fail to enforce a
contractual right against another subsidiary of the parent corporation.'
0 9
Zahn v. Transamerica Corp. shows how the obligations of controlling
shareholders devolve on the board of directors, which must act
disinterestedly with respect to the various classes of shareholders.
1 0
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., one of the most widely cited of corporate cases,
imposed an "unflinching" mandate upon directors in transactions involving
a controlling shareholder to "demonstrate their utmost good faith and the
most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain." '' Cases from California
and Massachusetts go further still, demanding duties from controlling
shareholders that mirror those typical of a partnership." 
2
But in QVC, the Delaware court seemed to suggest that even such
special legal protections for minority shareholders might not be enough.
The fiduciary obligations imposed on controlling shareholders did not
eradicate the "risks and consequences of holders of minority shares." 113 If
the shareholders were to suffer such a disadvantage, the court explained,
they must be compensated-in the form of a premium paid by the entity
taking control. According to the court, "[T]he Paramount stockholders are
entitled to receive, and should receive, a control premium .. . 14 The loss
of power implicated by the introduction of a controlling shareholder
required compensation.
The court suggested yet another alternative, an alternative that confirms
the court's ultimate concern for the risks associated with minority
shareholding. In structuring the merger, the board could, the court observes,
have put into place "devices protecting the minority stockholders."' 1 5 In
lieu of a control premium, the proposed merger could have granted minority
shareholders "protective devices of significant value."' 1 6 Such devices
could have included "supermajority voting provisions, majority of the
minority requirements, etc."" 7 That is, the merger might have protected
minority shareholders through procedural devices that ensured the
109. 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971).
110. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
111. 457 A.2d 701, 710(Del. 1983).
112. E.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969) (finding a cause of
action for minority shareholders where majority shareholders had formed a new corporation
whose principal asset was their control block of shares in the old corporation, thereby creating a
public market for majority shares, but not minority shares); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,
328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975) (holding that shareholders in a close corporation owe each other an
enhanced fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty, and requiring that minority shareholders
have an equal opportunity to have their shares redeemed by the corporation).
113. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1993).
114. ld. at 43.
115. Id. at 42.
116. Id. at 43.
117. Id. at 42 n.12.
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possibility of minority power. The court cited its decision in Ivanhoe
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,118 where the board protected minority
shareholders against the controlling shareholder through a standstill
agreement that limited the controlling shareholder's ownership and voting
power.' 19 The option of a procedural safeguard suggests that the Delaware
takeover jurisprudence may be more than the "search for hidden value" that
Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman suggest.120 To be sure, a belief in
"hidden value"--that is, company value not reflected in the stock market-
underlies the Delaware case law. If the Delaware Supreme Court did not
believe in hidden value, the case law could be simplified dramatically: The
corporate board would simply be obliged to maximize the current market
value of the consideration received for the company's stock. 121 But the
court's willingness to countenance transactions that guaranteed minorities
some degree of power against the controlling shareholder demonstrates that
minority protection serves as a driving concern in the case law.
This is not to say that the court's vigilance is entirely complete. When
Chancellor Allen observed that "[c]ontrol of [Paramount and Time]
remained in a large, fluid, changeable and changing market,"' 22 he seemed
to deny the basic insight of Berle and Means: that the modem public
corporation routinely separates ownership from control. Where Chancellor
Allen and the Delaware courts saw control vested in the market writ large,
Berle and Means would find control held by corporate management.
Although the Delaware courts have recognized the possibility of the abuse
of control by management in the face of a hostile acquirer,123 the board
retains substantial power to rebuff a disfavored bidder124-at least when the
board's plan does not introduce a new controlling shareholder. Thus, in a
corporation without a controlling shareholder, where every shareholder is
effectively a minority shareholder, the minority shareholders may remain
118. Id. (citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343
(Del. 1987)).
119. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1338.
120. Black & Kraakman, supra note 95, at 521.
121. On the question of market prices, see Daniel R. Fischel, Market Evidence in Corporate
Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 941 (2002).
122. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670 & 10935, 1989 WL
79880, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
123. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (noting
the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests" in the face of a
hostile takeover bid).
124. See Jennifer Arlen, Designing Mechanisms To Govern Takeover Defenses: Private
Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 917, 918
(2002) (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court's subsequent decisions have "removed the teeth"
from Unocal, allowing a board to "just say no" to acquisition). But see William T. Allen et al.,
The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1067, 1082 n.51 (2002) (giving the perspectives of current and former Delaware Chancery Court
judges, to wit, that "we do not embrace the views of those who believe that judicial review under,
for example, the Unocal standard is toothless").
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insufficiently protected against the new center of control-management.
The familiar collective action problem faced by dispersed shareholders
leaves shareholders vulnerable to managerial manipulation.1
21
In all of these decisions, we see the court's ultimate concern for
shareholders. This is well understood. But not all shareholders benefit
equally from the court's intervention. Courts are especially vigilant with
regard to minority shareholders, both in the face of a controlling
shareholder and, in the absence of a controlling shareholder, entrenched
management. The board of directors bears, in the words of a recent
Delaware Supreme Court decision, an "'affirmative duty to protect the
interests of the minority."",126 Corporate law here relies implicitly on a
theory of power, which I characterize in Part II. Furthermore, the
imposition of fiduciary duties on directors and controlling shareholders
reflects the law's current stance that market forces do not sufficiently
constrain exploitation by those with control.
The myriad of shareholder protections evident in the above cases are
remarkable for another reason: They are all judge-made. As Alfred Conard
describes it, "The law of corporations would be a sad rag if it were limited
to the emanations of the legislatures., 127 The fiduciary duties at the heart of
corporate law were devised not by legislators, but by judges.1 28 The
derivative suit was a procedural innovation designed by courts to remedy
"stockholder helplessness," in the words of the Supreme Court.' 29 The
countermajoritarian difficulty posed by unelected judges' 30  does not
constrain their activism, at least when they are acting on behalf of minority
125. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U.
CHI. L. REv. 973 (2002).
126. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919 (Del. 2000) (quoting Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J.
v. Scaly, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1338 (Del. Ch. 1987)); see also id. at 920 (recognizing a board's
"affirmative responsibility to protect... minority shareholders' interests").
127. ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 30 (1976). But see LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 511 (2d ed. 1985) ("Private practices and
legislation were the major makers of the law of corporations. The courts played a minor role.").
128. See CONARD, supra note 127, at 34-35 (remarking on "the fiduciary duty of directors, of
which not a word is said in the influential Delaware corporation code").
129. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); see also Prunty,
supra note 73, at 992 (concluding that "the origin of the derivative suit... lies in judicial
recognition of a new wrong.., for which pre-existing legal procedures proved more or less
inadequate"); id. at 986-87 (noting that Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832), is
often credited with "paternity of the shareholders' derivative action," but identifying an even
earlier origin in dictum in Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 389-90
(N.Y. Ch. 1817)).
130. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (agreeing that "Justices who are engaged in 'amending' the
Constitution are simply a body of electorally irresponsible politicians").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
shareholders. Judges show little anxiety that they, rather than legislators,
lead the fashioning of corporate law. Indeed, legislatures sometimes
perceive courts as going too far in fashioning minority protections: After
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom' 31 imposed
liability on directors for violating their duty of care by making an
uninformed judgment, the Delaware legislature mobilized to eliminate
director liability for damages for violations of the duty of care. 
32
The fact that shareholder protections lie in large part in judge-made
doctrines may help explain a fundamental finding of prominent empirical
work in comparative corporate governance by Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer, and Robert Vishny.133 These authors
show that countries with a common law heritage have deeper and more
liquid equity markets than do those with a civil law tradition. 34 The
common law origin of much of American shareholder-protection law
suggests that judges may be better positioned than legislators to fashion
devices to safeguard minority investors. This may be a question of both
knowledge and desire. It seems less likely to be a question of authority-
the doctrinal innovations of common law judges could have originated in
legislatures.135 Perhaps legislators ard guided by political interests (in which
controlling shareholders and management might be overrepresented),
whereas the (usually) appointed judiciary is more likely to put into practice
each judge's personal ethical code. Moreover, because judges are
themselves likely to belong to the class of minority investors (a class which
was, until recently, small relative to the entire population), they may be
especially vigilant about transgressions against minority shareholders.
B. Statutes and Constitutions
Minority shareholders need not rely on common law alone. While the
bulk of minority protections arise from judge-made duties, legislatures and
constitutional conventions have created or codified minority shareholder
131. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
132. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2002) (permitting corporations to amend their
charters to eliminate monetary liability for directors for many violations of the duty of care); see
also Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Del. 2001) (upholding an exculpatory provision
authorized by section 102(b)(7)).
133. La Porta et al., supra note 18; La Porta et al., supra note 19.
134. La Porta et al., supra note 18, at 8-9.
135. Coffee hypothesizes that the common law's advantage over civil law in holding
controlling shareholders to their fiduciary duties lies in the common law judge's greater freedom
to craft legal rules. John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons
from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 27-28 (1999). This is, of course, only a partial
explanation of the result obtained by La Porta et al., because it does not show why civil law
legislatures would not step in to create minority protection rules. I suggest here one possible
reason why judges might be more likely than legislatures to offer minority shareholder protection.
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protections. 36 Oppression and unfair prejudice are causes of action
available not in civil rights law, but in corporate law. Minority shareholder
protections are even enshrined in state constitutions in provisions
permitting cumulative voting. This Section examines the statutory and
constitutional framework for minority shareholder protection, moving from
provisions that are self-evidently directed at minority shareholders (such as
oppression, cumulative voting, and appraisal rights), to those that are less
evidently so (such as securities regulation).
37
1. Oppression
The cause of action for oppression developed out of the growing
recognition that minority shareholders in close corporations were
susceptible to abuse by the majority, through non-pro rata distributions and
other forms of self-dealing. 138 The close corporation context, in which
personal emoluments such as employment form a significant part of the
return on investment and in which ownership shares are relatively illiquid,
leaves the minority at heightened risk of exploitation.1 39 A concern for
minority oppression was evident even in nineteenth-century cases, as
observed in the first article ever published in this Journal.140 But an
136. Even here, however, judges do much of the work, implementing broad statutory
mandates through more particularized rules.
137. I do not consider all corporate minority protections, including many of the devices
employed by La Porta and his coauthors to construct their index of minority protection. See La
Porta et al., supra note 19, at 1126-31. I also exclude from consideration recent proposed changes
to limited liability, a fundamental corporate law doctrine. While it currently serves both
controlling and minority equity interests in the corporation, recent scholarship suggests that
limited liability should be denied to controlling shareholders. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-
Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (2002).
Such a move would reconstruct limited liability as a purely minority protection device. Empirical
research suggests that this may already be the default rule. Hansmann's and Kraakman's proposal
to deny limited liability for torts would do away with this judicial solicitude for passive minority
shareholders. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); cf Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited
Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47
VAND. L. REv. 1, 9 (1994) ("Courts generally refuse to impose liability on shareholders unless
they have control of the corporation .... ).
138. One court offers the following story to dramatize the plight of the minority shareholder
in the close corporation: 'There are 51 shares,' said he, 'that are worth $250,000. There are 49
shares that are not worth a _."' Humphrys v. Winous Co., 133 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ohio 1956).
139. See J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, llliquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977); cf
Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 267 (S.C. 2001) (finding an
"unequal balance of power" between majority and minority shareholders and upholding an
oppression claim where the controlling shareholder sought to deprive the minority shareholder of
his employment with the corporation and then sought to purchase the minority interest at a
discount).
140. See Simeon E. Baldwin, Voting-Trusts, I YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1891) (noting the
development of corporate law doctrines to "protect each stockholder against oppression by the
rest").
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inconsistent judicial response141 led to legislative intervention. "Oppression
as a ground for dissolution was included in the Illinois and Pennsylvania
corporations acts in 1933, in the first Model Business Corporation Act in
1946, and in the English Companies Act of 1948.,, 142 An action for
oppression or unfair prejudice now exists in most states, 143 and similar
doctrines have been developed in equity in other states.144 The doctrine also
exists in foreign common law jurisdictions. 41 Pennsylvania law even
authorizes a court to appoint a custodian to govern the affairs of a close
corporation where "those in control" have oppressed minority
shareholders. 1
46
The doctrine's status as a device for minority protection is well
documented. Perhaps more interesting is the doctrine's persistence in the
face of the contractarian reinvention of corporate law.147 The law does not
require the minority shareholder to protect herself by contract.1
48
Oppression doctrine gives the minority shareholder the benefit of a
hypothetical bargain that she never memorialized in an enforceable
agreement. 149 Take the case of Meiselman v. Meiselman,150 where the North
141. See 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 37, § 10:04.
142. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW.
699, 709 (1993).
143. Id. at 709 n.70 ("Thirty-seven states base relief on oppression or on language that would
be at least as likely to provide relief to petitioning shareholders. Thirty-one of those states include
'oppression' in their statute."). See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § l104-a(l) (McKinney 2003)
(permitting petitions for judicial dissolution of a corporation where "[t]he directors or those in
control of the corporation have been guilty of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions toward the
complaining shareholders"); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.05(A) (Vernon 2003) (permitting
the appointment of a receiver where "acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are
illegal, oppressive or fraudulent"). The Deleware Supreme Court, on the other hand, has refrained
from creating special judicial protections for minority shareholders in close corporations. See
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380-81 (Del. 1993).
144. See 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 37, at ix ("Even in the absence of statute, a few
courts have granted [the dissolution] remedy under their equitable powers.").
145. See ELIZABETH J. BOROS, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' REMEDIES 111-65 (1995)
(describing oppression/unfair prejudice remedies in English and Australian law); Brian Cheffins,
The Oppression Remedy in Corporate Law: The Canadian Experience, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L.
305 (1988) (describing the oppression remedy in Canadian law).
146. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1767(a)(2) (West 1995); see, e.g., Kevin B. Scott, Minority
Shareholder Rights: Pennsylvania's Custodian Statute, 65 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 97, 97 (1994).
147. Cf EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 228-52 (1991) (critiquing mandatory
legal rules designed to protect shareholders in close corporations).
148. Indeed, the oppression doctrine is justified on the ground that the minority shareholder
cannot protect herself by contract. See Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-
Fact Contracts: Is the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2001)
(arguing that the oppression doctrine is justified because contract law fails to protect adequately
minority investors' reasonable expectations).
149. Contractarians might explain this state intrusion on private ordering as simply enforcing
the bargain that the shareholders would have struck had they actually negotiated the point. But if
indeed a hypothetical bargain should be sufficient to garner the enforcement power of the state,
why does contract law generally find such bargains unenforceable? Perhaps the contractarians'
underlying claim is not the rightness of corporate law, but the wrongness of contract law (because
it often fails to enforce hypothetical bargains). A true contractarian victory should do away with
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Carolina Supreme Court noted the self-help possibility but excused the
minority shareholder for not protecting himself, explaining: "Some may
argue that the minority shareholder should have bargained for greater
protection before agreeing to accept his minority shareholder position in a
close corporation. However, the practical realities of this particular business
situation oftentimes do not allow for such negotiations."' 51 Not only are
negotiations not required, but the claim for oppression also may not be
yielded by the minority shareholder in a negotiation at the time the
investment is made, as the oppression claim is mandatory law.
152
2. Cumulative Voting
It was Lani Guinier's invocation of corporate cumulative voting for the
political context that earned her the label "quota queen. ' 53 In corporate
law, however, cumulative voting is a venerable device for minority
protection, though it has fallen far from its zenith. In citing this procedure,
Professor Guinier was only retracing corporate law's own borrowing from
politics.
The origins of cumulative voting 154 in corporate law lie in the political
writings of John Stuart Mill. Seeking to ensure that a minority would be
"heard" in a democracy,' 55 Mill recommended a number of voting
procedures that would help guarantee minority representation in a
legislature. He described, for instance, a procedure whereby "the elector
retained his three votes, but was at liberty to bestow them all upon the same
candidate."' 156 While Mill's proposals about minority political classes were
circulating, minority shareholders were suffering from "publicized sagas of
corporate freebooting" including most conspicuously those of Drew, Fisk,
most corporate law altogether, except perhaps as a species of contract and property law. Even off-
the-shelf default rules could be supplied by the private market.
150. 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
151. Id. at 558.
152. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet To Set: Match-
Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 924 (1999)
("These various doctrines have proved difficult to contract out of.").
153. See supra note 11.
154. "Cumulative voting is a means devised to protect minorities by providing a method of
voting which assures to a minority, if it is sufficiently purposeful and cohesive, representation on
the board of directors to an extent roughly proportionate to the minority's size." CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86 n.ll (1987) (citation omitted). The mechanism is as
follows: "[E]ach shareholder possesses a number of votes equal to the number of his or her shares
multiplied by the number of directorships to be filled, but can distribute the product among
candidates as he or she chooses." 2 JONATHAN R. MACEY, MACEY ON CORPORATION LAWS
§ 13.16[B] (Supp. 1999).
155. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 127 (E.P.
Dutton & Co. 1928) (1861).
156. Id. at 133.
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and Gould in the Erie Railroad. 57 These circumstances help explain how
cumulative voting came to be introduced to corporate governance through
state constitutional amendments. Prominent at the Illinois constitutional
convention of 1870 was Joseph Medill, an "ardent advocate" of John Stuart
Mill's principle of minority protection. 158 Medill helped persuade the
convention to amend the state constitution to require cumulative voting
both for representatives to the state house and for corporate directors.
In corporate law, cumulative voting became a method by which
minorities could not only be heard, but also could see, with their elected
representatives acting as a "window into the boardroom."1 59 Even today, the
justifications for cumulative voting in corporate law track those originally
offered by Mill in favor of minority representation in government.
160
The "high water mark" of cumulative voting occurred in the late 1940s,
when twenty-two states constitutionally mandated cumulative voting in
corporations. 61 Today, only six states provide for cumulative voting for
directors in their constitutions, and none requires it. 162 Every state permits
cumulative voting for directors; 163 but now that it is no longer mandatory,
this most well-known of minority protection devices has proven unpopular,
with few modem corporations choosing the device. 164 It seems that, left to
fend for themselves, minorities have either determined that cumulative
voting was an unnecessary protection or have failed to persuade
corporations to adopt it.
157. CHARLES M. WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 21 (1951).
158. Whitney Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10 BuS.
LAW. 3,4 (1955).
159. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 55, at 599; Harlowe E. Bowes & Ledlie A. De Bow,
Cumulative Voting at Elections of Directors of Corporations, 21 MINN. L. REV. 351, 353 (1937)
(explaining that cumulative voting enables minority interests "to 'obtain direct contact with the
business of the corporation, and its management, and observe the conduct of the corporate
officers"' (quoting State ex rel. Price v. DuBrul, 126 N.E. 87 (Ohio 1919))). See generally
CLARK, supra note 29, § 9.1.3 (summarizing arguments for and against cumulative voting).
160. Campbell, supra note 158, at 14 ("The arguments presented by those who favor
cumulative voting for directors are similar to those originally made by John Stuart Mill in writing
on the desirability of minority representation in government.").
161. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative
Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 145 (1994).
162. ARIZ. CONST. art. XIV, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 4; ILL. CONST. Transition
Schedule § 8 (1970); MO. CONST. art. XI, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. XII, § 8; W. VA. CONST.
art. XI, § 4.
163. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86 n.11 (1987).
164. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMICS 445-56 (2002) (arguing
that cumulative voting has grown increasingly unpopular because of its tendency to create an
adversarial board controlled by majority factions); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATE LAW §
5.2.1.A, 481-86 (2000) (maintaining that cumulative voting is ineffective unless minority
shareholders control a substantial percentage of outstanding voting stock).
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3. Appraisal
The disaffected minority shareholder faced with an unappealing
corporate reorganization finds some refuge in state corporate codes. Rather
than suffer the consequences of continuing her investment or being cashed
out at an unattractive price, the shareholder can seek to divest herself of the
investment at a judicially appraised value. The corporate codes of every
state grant shareholders this right of appraisal in the event of certain
fundamental changes.
1 65
The right is, however, severely compromised. Procedural requirements
and, most importantly, a bar against class actions render appraisal a remedy
generally not worth the cost of its exercise, except for minority investors
with very valuable stakes. About half of the states, including Delaware,
deny an appraisal right to shareholders in public companies, presumably on
the theory that such shareholders can find liquidity at a fair price in the
public market. 66 In addition, some states offer appraisal as the exclusive
option of the aggrieved shareholder, thereby denying the shareholder the
right to enjoin an unfair transaction and retain her investment.
Despite its imperfect protection, the appraisal right demonstrates
corporate law's view that independent assessments may be necessary from
time to time. Rather than leave the minority investor to the mercy of the
bargain struck upon entry, it provides her with a statutory right to invoke a
judicial inquiry into fair price.
4. Securities Regulation
The elaborate framework regulating securities offerings, too, can be
understood principally as a means of protecting minority investors from
exploitation by managers and controlling shareholders. 67 While securities
law protects rich and poor alike-the institutional investor alongside the
middle class retiree-it is motivated largely by the concern that controlling
persons, be they controlling shareholders or managers, may exercise their
165. Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate
Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (1995); see also James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting
Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1964) (noting that all states but
West Virginia grant appraisal rights).
166. See Thompson, supra note 165, at 29. This public market exception to the appraisal right
rests on the efficient market hypothesis: The public market is presumed to offer a fair opportunity
for exit. This presumption is contrary to Delaware jurisprudence, which, as I noted earlier, denies
the accuracy of the prevailing market price as a signifier of "intrinsic" value.
167. See Coffee, supra note 18, at 652 (noting the special focus of the federal securities laws
on constraining controlling shareholders).
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power to garner disproportionate shares of corporate wealth at the expense
of minority shareholders. 
168
The fundamental mandate of American securities regulation-
disclosure of material information-serves principally to benefit minority
investors. Controlling shareholders, by virtue of their control, have other
avenues to obtain information, including, for example, their representatives
on the board of directors. And directors and officers, of course, are
presumed to be well aware of corporate information. Periodic reporting,
169
proxy communications, 170 and prospectus delivery requirements171 seek to
keep the minority investor duly informed about her investment. The goal is
not only to enhance decisionmaking ability, but also more specifically to
avoid manipulation of investors by corporations or traders. John Coffee
identifies the following constraints on controlling shareholders in American
securities law:
(1) [I]ts ownership disclosure rules deny them the veil of
anonymity by requiring a transparent ownership structure pursuant
to section 13(d) of the Exchange Act;
(2) its insider trading rules restrict (with criminal penalties) their
ability to purchase or sell based on material, nonpublic information;
(3) its tender offer rules assure all shareholders an equal
opportunity to participate in any tender offer for their shares;
(4) its continuous disclosure system generally requires timely
disclosure of material developments by the issuer or controlling
shareholders; and
(5) its "going private" rules deny controlling shareholders the
practical ability to squeeze out the minority at an unfairly low
price. 172
In crafting such a defensive regime, securities regulation responds to
experience not only with the "gullibility of buyers" of securities, 73 but also
with the devious schemes of manipulators. The recent innovation of "plain
168. Securities regulation, of course, extends to debt securities as well as equity securities. I
do not mean to characterize all of securities regulation as having a single-minded focus on
minority shareholder protection.
169. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000).
170. Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act sets forth the proxy disclosure requirements.
15 U.S.C. § 78n.
171. See Securities Act of 1933 §.5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
172. Coffee, supra note 18, at 690-91 (footnote omitted).
173. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (4th
ed. 2001).
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English" in disclosure reflects a concern that buyers might be misled or
even duped by impenetrable prose. 74 The paternalistic concern with
protecting investors from making misinformed decisions becomes clear in
the circumstances where securities law reduces its demands. At times,
securities law relaxes its mandates for entities better able to secure their
own position in the corporation without state assistance. Entities identified
as "accredited investors"1 75 or "qualified institutional buyers"'176 may invest
with fewer mandatory protections. There are even "portals" through which
only qualified investors may trade. 177 Securities law eases its requirements
on the theory that some minority investors are better able than others to
fend for themselves. 178  For sophisticated minority investors, the
presumption of peril can be relaxed.
179
The fact that much of securities regulation is mandatory, not
permissive, demonstrates the extent to which the law refuses to rely on
contract alone to reach its goals of investor protection 80 Prominent recent
scholarship questions this mandatory nature, suggesting that issuer choice
of regulatory regime might prove a more efficient system of investment.
81
174. Plain English Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 39,593, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370 (Feb. 6,
1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-30, 239, and 274) (explaining the need for a plain English
requirement based on the fact that prospectuses today are difficult to understand because of
unnecessarily complex language and stilted jargon).
175. Rule 501(a)(5) under Regulation D of the Securities Act defines any "natural person
whose individual net worth... exceeds $1,000,000" to be an "accredited investor." 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a)(5) (2003). Regulation D exempts from registration offers that are extended to a
limited number of investors. Id. §§ 230.504-.506.
176. Rule 144A provides a safe harbor from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act for resales of certain securities among "qualified institutional buyers" (institutions that own or
manage at least $100 million of securities). Id. § 230.144A.
177. The portal market permits secondary trading of unregistered securities in transactions
exempt from registration pursuant to SEC Rule 144A. See NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, NASD
MANUAL § 5322 (2001).
178. Under Regulation D, while "accredited investors" are presumed to be sophisticated
investors, nonaccredited investors must have "such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that they are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment." 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). Similarly, Rule 144A justifies the relaxation of
requirements for the "investment sophistication" of the qualified institutional buyers. Resale of
Restricted Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6862, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,523 (Apr. 23, 1990).
179. Of course, even sophisticated investors may not always be able to penetrate the dense
prose of disclosure documents. The noted (and certainly sophisticated) billionaire investor Warren
Buffett implies that he too will be a beneficiary of plain English requirements: "For more than
forty years, I've studied the documents that public companies file. Too often, I've been unable to
decipher just what is being said ...." Warren E. Buffett, Preface to OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC.
& ASSISTANCE, SEC, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: How To CREATE CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE
DOCUMENTS 1 (1998).
180. But see Chander, Diaspora Bonds, supra note 5, at 1081-86 (noting recent case law
permitting investors to opt out of the securities laws in certain circumstances despite an apparent
statutory command to the contrary).
181. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J.
INT'L L. 815 (2001); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Roberta Romano,
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Yet there is little likelihood that, in the face of the recent catastrophic
collapses of public companies, there will be a relaxation of the securities
regime. Indeed, the securities market crisis for which Enron and WorldCom
serve as synecdoches led to the adoption of legislation that heightens
disclosure standards. 18 2 Finally, the complexity of the securities market and
the opaqueness of brokerage transactions have led even contractarians to
endorse retaining mandatory regulation of securities exchanges and
brokers. 1
83
One might have expected to find in corporate law the unimpeded values
of the market-of private contracting and property rights. Instead, the
above study reveals that corporate law does not yield entirely to the
operation of the market.
Rather, corporate law is largely motivated by fear of the abuse of
control by controlling shareholders or controlling management. It
recognizes the differential power relationships that exist within the
corporate structure and seeks to manage them in a way that is ultimately
beneficial to society. It is to the elaboration of this insight in the
constitutional realm to which I now turn.
II. LIKE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
The civil rights project has expanded by analogy to earlier struggles,
with the recent women's rights, gay rights, and disabled rights campaigns
modeling themselves explicitly on the earlier African-American rights
campaign. But with the recent judicial assault on affirmative action, "like
race" arguments have fallen out of favor, criticized as liable to hurt, not
help, the call for substantive equality.1 84 The discussion above in Part I
demonstrates the existence of a vibrant part of American law that protects
minorities-namely, minority shareholders. In this Part, I show that civil
rights struggles could proceed on an alternative analogy by turning to
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998)
[hereinafter Romano, Empowering Investors]; Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in
International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001).
182. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
183. See, e.g., Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 181, at 2369 ("The federal
securities regime regarding the regulation of securities markets and market professionals who
broker transactions between investors and issuers is excluded from the proposed market
approach.").
184. See Janet E. Halley, "Like Race" Arguments, in JUDITH BUTLER ET AL., WHAT'S LEFT
OF THEORY? 40 (2000).
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minority shareholders, a genus of minority that has heretofore escaped the
attention of civil rights scholars. An examination of the motivations
underlying law's solicitude towards minority shareholders reveals a concern
for fairness and capital formation that has direct application to the issue of
affirmative action.
But is not race different from shareholding? Yes, of course. I do not
claim that minority status per se necessitates legal protection. My goal here
is not "to vary the .. level of abstraction to make it come out right."'' 85 I
thus consider the differences between minority races and minority
shareholders to see whether the differences justify law's divergent
approaches to the two.
While consideration of the different contexts in which minorities arise
is necessary, it must be remembered that the burden of the argument might
just as easily be said to fall on those who would maintain divergent
approaches. It would seem that the default rule should favor like treatment
of minorities-regardless of whether they are minorities in constitutional or
corporate law. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has announced a principle
of "consistency," though it applies this principle only with respect to
governmental racial classifications.1 86 Those who endorse different
treatment must be prepared to defend it. Of course, I defend here another
kind of difference-between minorities and controlling persons-while at
the same time proposing a general, unified theory of legal treatment of
minorities.
My claim for a level of universality finds support in a somewhat
surprising quarter. The Chicago economics tradition-articulated most
forcefully by Gary Becker' 8 7-takes as its foundational principle that there
is a universal science that can encompass all human relations, from the
economic to the familial. Such a science becomes possible because of the
belief that human behavior has a consistency across operational realms.
88
My own claim for transcendence is more modest, though it too is ultimately
behavioral. I suggest that both corporate law and constitutional law address
a similar dynamic-the exercise of power by controlling groups to benefit
themselves at the expense of minorities. This Part thus concludes with a
discussion of power in both the corporate and constitutional spheres,
drawing upon the work of critical race scholars and corporate law theorists.
185. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 61
(1980).
186. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995) (describing
"consistency" as one of "three general propositions with respect to governmental racial
classifications").
187. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).
188. Id. at 14. The behavioral law and economics movement-which recognizes the
irrationalities and biases in human behavior-substantially complicates the law and economics
project.
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I find in both an understanding of power that resonates with the theories of
Michel Foucault. My underlying argument is that the primary project of law
is to regulate the exercise of power.
While affirmative action programs generally seek to promote
opportunities for women as well as people of minority races, I will speak
generally of race rather than of gender. But the analogy between minority
shareholders and women may also be quite instructive. For example, my
description of how smaller groups can come to dominate larger ones (what I
refer to as the "majority-minority" issue)18 9 resonates especially well with
the condition of women in society. At the same time, differences between
race and gender should not be minimized. I also do not consider here the
status of sexual minorities, though I anticipate that much useful work could
be done to relate the status of such minorities to the structure of corporate
law.' 90 Additionally, affirmative action programs occasionally turn on
economic status, 191 but I do not apply my analysis directly to subordination
by poverty, though poverty is often the basis for subordination. 192 I also do
not consider minority status based on religion, age, weight, and other such
characteristics, though again such characteristics might form the basis for
subordination and remediation.
193
In contrasting aspects of corporate and constitutional law, I follow a
long and renowned tradition of intradisciplinary work. 194  Such
intradisciplinarity seems especially appropriate to law, a discipline that
relies on analogical reasoning. Differences between legal domains must be
justified by differing circumstances or objectives. Intradisciplinarity
transfers theories, practices, and technologies across legal domains. 195 More
189. See infra Section III.C.
190. Martha Ertman's work relating marriage law to the law on close corporations offers an
important example of such comparative studies. See Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade:
Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001).
191. The program at issue in Adarand, for example, made special provision for
"'economically disadvantaged"' persons. 515 U.S. at 209 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 23.69 (1994)).
192. See CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARl J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING
THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 178-202 (1997).
193. See ROBERT POST, Prejudicial Appearances, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES 1, 10-11
(2001) (discussing discrimination based on immutable traits, such as sex, and mutable traits, such
as obesity).
194. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974) (considering the
intersection of torts and contracts); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)
(describing property and liability rules and inalienability, and revealing the underlying goals that
property, tort, and criminal law share); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1686 (1976) (observing that contracts scholarship is "full
of insights that seem to beg for application beyond the narrow compass within which their authors
developed them").
195. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1217, 1221
(2002) (arguing that interdisciplinary work in law improves knowledge about law and legal
institutions, advances the practice of law and quality of legal rules, and benefits other disciplines).
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fundamentally, it helps reveal law's larger projects and, at times, law's
hypocrisies.
A. Managing Power
While now often associated with radical thought, legal theories based
on power have a long provenance in corporate law. In their classic text on
the modem corporation, Berle and Means speak of "power and its
regulation."' 96 Berle spent much of his later life thinking about the
"problem of power."' 97 His interest might even be called an obsession-
witness his four books focused on the subject, capped in 1969 with a book
titled simply Power.198 Berle, John Kenneth Galbraith writes, "over a long
life concerned himself more deeply than any other American writer with the
nature of power."' 199
Berle traces the "changing location of power" in the corporation. 20 0 But
while he carefully catalogues the characteristics of power, he devotes few
pages to the question of how power might be constrained.2 °1 Scholars,
judges, and legislators have, however, taken up the baton in crafting the
technology of minority shareholder protection in the face of corporate
power holders. These reformers located power and sought to prevent its
abuse. People such as Hodge O'Neal meticulously studied how, for
example, shareholders might be oppressed within the close corporation
202
and identified strategies to counter such oppression. 20 3 The mechanisms of
corporate law are often explicitly sensitive to power relations, from
then-Judge Cardozo's observation that "[a] dominating influence may be
exerted in other ways than by a vote' 204 to the assumption of the securities
laws that controlling shareholders and insiders must be treated differently
from others.
20 5
We must ask here the crucial question: Why does corporate law focus
on power? The answer is that its focus on power is necessary to further its
196. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 1932, supra note 41, at 353.
197. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 79 (1959).
198. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY (1957); ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR., POWER (1969) [hereinafter, BERLE, POWER]; BERLE, supra note 197; ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR., THE THREE FACES OF POWER (1967).
199. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 48 (1983).
200. BERLE, supra note 197, at 69.
201. See, e.g., id. at 87-93 (offering, as possible limits on corporate power, pluralism, the
need for profits, corporate conscience and prestige loss, and periodic government intervention).
202. See, e.g., F. HODGE O'NEAL & JORDAN DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES: SQUEEZE-OUTS IN SMALL ENTERPRISES 4-5, 41-60 (1961).
203. See, e.g., id. at 170-90.
204. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec., Co., 121 N.E. 378, 379-80 (N.Y. 1918).
205. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
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goals of capital formation and fairness.2 °6 John Coffee sums up my
corporate law claim pithily: "'[S]trong' regulation permits 'weak'
owners."
20 7
Power, of course, is not alien to constitutional law. The federal
government, we know, is one of enumerated powers; their exercise is
checked through the separation of powers. Yet, when constitutional law
turns its gaze to educational and workplace opportunities, it turns a blind
eye to power. The current constitutional understanding is bitingly
summarized by Kimberl Crenshaw: "After all, equal opportunity is the
rule, and the market is an impartial judge; if Blacks are on the bottom, it
must reflect their relative inferiority., 20 8 This understanding is indifferent to
power relations; any relations of domination or oppression are only
products of marketplace judgments, which are themselves impartial.
This view is, of course, the target of feminist and other critical scholars.
For them, the marketplace in education and labor cannot be understood
without accounting for relations of domination and subordination. Critical
race scholars seek to foreground racial subordination in their examination
of the law,2 °9 while feminists foreground sexual power as central to
understanding legal relations.21 ° Both sets of scholars reject theories of law
that seek to combat only discrimination, finding them insufficient for the
protection of minority groups.2 1 Where antidiscrimination focuses on the
formal evenhandedness in the "allocative process," the antisubordination
principle favored by critical theorists requires consideration of the power
relations in operation. Racial and gender justice, they argue, requires a more
substantive principle of equality. This is because the existing hegemony
operates so convincingly as to make its operation invisible: As Mari
206. See infra Section lI.B.
207. Coffee, supra note 18, at 648.
208. KimberlM Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1380 (1988).
209. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 26-50 (1987).
210. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 32-45 (1987).
211. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1035-45 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 129-46 (1976); Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race,
Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 822-25
(1995). Owen Fiss differentiates between antidiscrimination and antisubordination (in the context
of gender) as follows:
The antisubordination principle ... is not confined to the regulation of the type of
allocative process that is the special focus of the antidiscrimination principle. It reaches
any practice or institution that disadvantages women, and accordingly has been used to
support increases in the availability of birth control and child care facilities, as well as
requiring employers to provide parental leave.
Owen M. Fiss, What Is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 419 (1994).
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Matsuda writes, "Power at its peak is so quiet and obvious in its place of
seized truth that it becomes, simply, truth rather than power.
'21 2
This critical view coincides in an important way with that of corporate
law, which also requires an accounting of power relations in generating
legal decisions. Both corporate law and critical scholarship recognize, often
implicitly, the inability of market mechanisms alone to avert minority abuse
by those in power. My goal here is not to assert the truth value of these
critical claims about race or gender, but only to assert that they are the
kind of inquiries relevant to legal decision. Moreover, they are the kind
of inquiries-about domination, subordination, and oppression-that
corporate law routinely undertakes.
It does not follow that all claims for subordination are equally worthy.
Some affirmative action programs may have overreached, covering groups
that did not need them under the circumstances, while other affirmative
action programs may have underreached. The determination of which
minorities deserve affirmative protection must be both careful and context-
specific.213
It is only after the identification of power and domination that
corporate law and critical scholarship part company. Where critical scholars
aspire to the destruction of hegemony,214 corporate law aspires only to its
management. Corporate law recognizes the inevitability of power
imbalances. In response to the possible self-dealing of controlling
shareholders and management, corporate law seeks to establish other
resources of power in minority shareholders.
215The paramount resource is information. Like the Benthamite
Panopticon-the prison in which the warden can see all that passes 2 6-the
public corporation configures minority shareholders as mini-wardens. As
Foucault writes, "[T]he major effect of the Panopticon [is] to induce in the
inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the
automatic functioning of power."217 Securities regulation's strict disclosure
requirements, 1 8 the Schedule 13G reporting requirements for owners of
more than five percent of outstanding shares, 2t 9 inspection rights, and the
212. Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1765 (1990).
213. See infra Section II.D.
214. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983).
215. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 78 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al.
trans., Pantheon Books 1980) (1972) (relating knowledge to power).
216. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., Verso 1995)
(1791).
217. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 201 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon
Books 1977) (1975).
218. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2000).
219. Id. § 7 8 m(g).
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derivative suit 220 help to create a disciplinary power that counters that of
controlling shareholders or management.
221
In a broad sense, affirmative action can be understood in a similar vein.
The promotion of education and workplace opportunities among the less
powerful in society is designed precisely to create resources of power in
this part of the community. Both education and employment empower
individuals to help protect themselves against exploitation by others.
Foucault observes that disciplinary technologies such as the Panopticon
have been operationalized in multiple domains; he asks, "Is it surprising
that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all
resemble prisons? ' 222 We might similarly ask: Is it surprising that
corporations in some ways resemble constitutional domains?
B. Motivations
In order to examine whether the analogy between minority shareholders
and minority races holds, it is important to ask why corporate law protects
minority shareholders. I identify two reasons: a desire for fairness and the
promotion of capital formation. I note at the outset that it is possible to
collapse the two goals into one: Fairness might be described as a purely
instrumental device, designed ultimately to promote capital formation. This
does not defeat my reasoning, as I rely principally on capital formation, not
fairness, to draw my analogy. In Part III, I complete my argument by
demonstrating that the goal of capital formation might also justify minority
protection in the constitutional context.
1. Fairness
The concern for fairness to minority shareholders has a long history
in corporate law. Majority rule and board control are tempered by
doctrines designed to deter unfairness toward minority shareholders.
Nineteenth-century conceptions of the corporation sought to limit the
voting power of large shareholders.223 At that time, major changes required
a unanimous vote, allowing minority shareholders to veto significant
changes antithetical to their interests. As we have seen, cumulative voting
220. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a).
222. FOUCAULT, supra note 217, at 228.
223. David L. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the
Rule of "One Share, One Vote, " 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1970). Ratner goes on to argue for
the radical proposal that any person, even without equity ownership, should receive an equal vote
in corporate elections. Id. at 52.
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for corporate boards stemmed from notions of fairness to minorities
described by John Stuart Mill.
2 24
Even today, the fiduciary duties that make up much of the law of
corporate governance rely centrally on notions of "fairness." In interested
shareholder transactions, for example, the controlling shareholder bears the
burden under Delaware law of proving "inherent fairness." 225 In large part,
the fiduciary duty of loyalty seeks to sort out interested director transactions
on the basis of fairness.226 The tests for actions like the usurpation of
corporate opportunity rely on notions of fairness. Then-Chief Judge
Cardozo's famous requirement of the "finest loyalty" from fiduciaries,227
though propounded in the partnership context, finds its way into the
corporate realm.228 Indeed, it has survived into the new millennium, cited
by the Fifth Circuit in a recent corporate law case.229 Then-Chief Judge
Cardozo, we recall, called upon fiduciaries to abjure the "morals of the
market place., 230 This moralistic tone-captured most succinctly in
Cardozo's standard of "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive' 231 runs
deep through the history of American corporate law.232 In interpreting (and
inventing) corporate law, courts often look "not to the technical knowledge
of economics... but to the everyday notions of right conduct., 233 It is
fairness, not efficiency, that is typically on the lips of judges.234 Securities
regulation too was founded in part on legislative perceptions of the
unfairness of exploitation by controlling persons of minority investors. The
Securities Act was introduced in the pages of the Harvard Law Review in
1934 as "in the main a modification of common-law deceit principles to
meet the exigencies of a corporate economy., 235 For its part, the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 repeatedly references the need to ensure fair and
224. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
225. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
226. See, e.g., WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 950-951 (perm ed., rev. vol. 2002); 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 34, § 5.10 (requiring that transactions between a controlling
shareholder and a corporation be "fair" to the corporation).
227. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
228. See Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of
Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 69 (2000).
229. Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 468 n.23 (5th Cir. 2000).
230. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
231. Id.
232. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 7 (2003) ("For centuries, courts have used the language of moral
reasoning .... [C]ourts often refer to 'fairness,' 'good faith,' 'justifiable reliance,' 'loyalty,'
,candor,' 'exploitation,' and 'penalties."').
233. Id.
234. See id. at 2 ("[Clourts ... frequently invoke the concept of fairness in their work and
rarely address the efficiency of corporate law doctrines, at least in so many words.").
235. Note, Federal Regulation of Securities: Some Problems of Civil Liability, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 107, 121 (1934).
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honest markets.236 According to the Supreme Court, the goal of the
Securities Exchange Act was "to achieve a high standard of business ethics
in the securities industry. 237
2. Capital Formation
To contractarians, the concern for fairness in corporate law seems
misplaced. Easterbrook and Fischel put it nicely: "Investors are not
candidates for transfers of wealth; this is not a branch of poverty law....
Questions of distribution among investors are unimportant; allocating gains
to one rather than another changes relative prices but not social wealth.,
238
Corporate law, contractarians claim, should be structured for one immediate
goal alone: efficiency. Efficiency, of course, may come at the price of
distributional equity-as Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge. To a large
extent, this law and economics vision has come to dominate thinking about
corporate law, in both the judiciary and the academy. As time passes,
Meinhard is invoked ever more rarely in corporate law opinions. And for its
part, the academy reinterprets corporate doctrines according to the dictates
of the efficiency norm.
According to the contractarian reading, concerns for fairness are not
about justice at all; they are about efficiency. 240 Ensuring that a minority
shareholder is treated "fairly" by the controlling shareholder or
management encourages people to invest funds without needing to worry
about expropriation. 24' This is the central insight of comparative corporate
governance theorists. As La Porta and his coauthors write, "Corporate
governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside
236. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (describing the need to "promote just and equitable
principles of trade"); id. § 78k(a)(2) (describing the need for "fair and orderly markets"); id.
§ 781(b)(2) (describing the need to promote "fair dealing" in securities markets).
237. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
238. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 23.
240. Courts, however, often seem to value fairness and efficiency as separate, though related,
goals. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 188
(1994) (describing the "goals of fair dealing and efficiency in the securities markets").
241. Even advocates of corporate responsibility recognize this rationale for corporate law:
Just as the Bill of Rights protects minorities from the tyranny of the majority, corporate
law sets limits upon how far a majority may impose its will upon the minority. And it is
essential that corporate law do so. Some level of protection is necessary to encourage
persons to pool their capital in an incorporated venture.
Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Refonn" and the New Corporate Social
Responsibility, 62 U. P177. L. REV. 605, 621 (2001).
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investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders. 242 And
by "insiders," they mean "both managers and controlling shareholders."
243
The theory underlying the Berle-Means modem corporation is that
large scale enterprise needs to pool equity capital from many people who
will cede working control over that capital.244 Protections against
expropriation-and, equally important, protections regarding the fair
division of potential gains-help lead capitalists to part with control over
their capital. The need to protect minority shareholders exists not only in
large corporations, but also in small ones. As Hodge O'Neal writes, in the
case of close corporations: "[A] potential source of much-needed risk
capital for small business enterprises is threatened by the prevalence of
squeeze-outs. 245
C. Differences
All this does not establish my claim. Even if the reasons for minority
shareholder protection are applicable to minority racial protection, the
differences between the domains of shareholding and race may yet disrupt
my syllogism. Consider the following differences: (1) a special concern for
protecting property rights; (2) the different American histories of
corporations and of racism; (3) the difference in the exit option for
shareholders and citizens; and (4) the notion that race-based dynamics,
unlike corporate dynamics, are too amorphous to meet the strict demands of
law. But locating differences does not itself mandate different treatment-
the question remains whether the difference is salient. Indeed, I argue
below that none of these differences justifies the sharply divergent
approaches taken in the law.
First, protecting minority shareholders serves to protect property rights,
but property rights may also be enhanced by minority racial protection. The
goal of protecting existing property rights is often emphasized at the
expense of the more efficiency-minded goal of increasing societal wealth.
For its part, corporate law refuses the narrow-minded protection of existing
wealth and seeks instead to spur capital formation. Property rights might
ultimately be made more robust through legal efforts to enlarge the group of
people holding property.
242. La Porta et al., supra note 18, at 4.
243. Id.
244. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 1967, supra note 41, at 2 ("In its new
aspect the corporation is a means whereby the wealth of innumerable individuals has been
concentrated into huge aggregates and whereby control over this wealth has been surrendered to a
unified direction.").
245. 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 37, § 1:04.
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Second, while history certainly helps explain why the law bears the
contours it bears, one might have expected history to produce an
upside-down result: more protection for minority races and less for minority
shareholders. This is because the tragic history of racism should imply an
increased obligation to ensure substantive equality today.246 If history is to
be the guide, then the debt accumulated toward minority races through a
cruel history of racism and colonialism should mandate significant
protections for minority races.
The availability of exit differentiates the corporate and political
spheres. 247 While a shareholder in a publicly-held corporation can leave
easily by liquidating her position, a citizen has stronger ties that make exit
far more difficult. 248 But, again, this difference should only heighten the
need to protect minorities in the political realm. Political minorities, unable
to escape oppression easily, exist at the mercy of those in control. Indeed, it
is precisely this concern that leads corporate law to heighten its concerns
for minorities-the limited liquidity of shareholdings in a close corporation
causes corporate law to scrutinize such domains especially closely for
evidence of oppression. Analogously, because those in control in politics
need not fear minority flight, they can set the terms of their relationship
with the minority to maximize exploitation. Any party who lacks the ability
to walk away from a proposed deal stands to lose the bulk of any gains
from trade. What's more, while scholars have long focused on options for
exit, conditions of entry may be as significant-and work again in favor of
legal solicitude for racial minorities. While persons generally enter a
corporation upon making a relatively free choice, persons generally enter
nation-states without making a choice. Even immigrants face severe
restrictions on their choice, whether it be the coercion of war or poverty
leading them to leave home or the hurdles of immigration laws in potential
host states. 249 The weaker voluntariness of entry in political society should
lead us to heightened concern for members of polities than for members of
corporations-either because of the moral valence of choice itself or
246. For a strong exposition of this claim, see RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT
AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000).
247. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4-5 (1970). Hirschman suggests that where dissatisfied
persons in the polity might register their dissatisfaction through "voice," those in the corporation
are more likely to register their unhappiness through "exit." Id.; see also Samuel Issacharoff &
Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 643, 649 (1998) ("If all else fails in the corporate sphere, the option of 'exit' is always
available to the dissatisfied public shareholder. No such exit strategy exists in the political
arena.").
248. On liberalism's overreliance on the availability of exit for members of a community, see
Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 535-44 (2001).
249. Cf Chander, Diaspora Bonds, supra note 5, at 1017.
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because of the inability of some to protect themselves by refusing to enter
unattractive situations.
Finally, the amorphousness of racism has often been used to rebuff
efforts to protect minority races. 250 But corporate law demonstrates that
amorphousness is not limited only to racism and its consequences. Despite
the imprecision of standards 251 such as "fairness,', 252 "control," and
"domination," 253 corporate law insists upon inquiry into these issues in
order to reach an equitable result for minority shareholders. Judges must
detect the presence of control, despite its "chameleon-like ' 254 nature. The
difficulty of the endeavor should not excuse us from its undertaking.
Through experience with cases and precedents, judges routinely infuse
content into amorphous standards.
Am I drawing the exactly wrong lesson from the markets? Should we
not see the marketplace as the epitome of deracination-with differences
found only in price and quality-rather than the identity of market
participants? Consider Voltaire's heroic description of one marketplace:
Go into the Exchange in London, that place more venerable
than many a court, and you will see representatives of all the
nations assembled there for the profit of mankind. There the Jew,
Mahometan, and the Christian deal with one another as if they were
of the same religion, and reserve the name of infidel for those who
go bankrupt.
255
Voltaire's vision of a society of fellows united by a common enterprise
despite private differences is certainly attractive. However, I believe it is
inapposite for a number of reasons. First, markets themselves are not free of
250. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion)
("No one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis
for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal
discrimination is insufficient and over-expansive."); cf Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second
Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1183, 1189 (1993) (book
review) (suggesting that "talk about a culture of racism, interest-convergence, hegemony, false
consciousness" might be considered "vague and unquantifiable").
25 1. Corporate law often favors flexible, context-sensitive standards over rigid, bright-line
rules. Duncan Kennedy has famously argued that the choice of standards in private law reflects an
altruistic turn. Kennedy, supra note 194, at 1776. Kathleen Sullivan observes that while rules are
associated with formal equality, standards often support substantive justice. Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 62, 66 (1992).
252. See supra notes 223-237 and accompanying text.
253. For a prominent recent example, see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d
342, 356-61 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000), where the Chancery Court "meticulously" inquired into whether Disney's Chairman
and CEO, Michael D. Eisner, dominated the members of the Disney board. 746 A.2d at 258.
254. David C. Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22, 30 (1963).
255. VOLTAIRE, On the Presbyterians, in PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS 25, 26 (Ernest Dilworth
trans., 1961) (1732).
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256the notice of the race, ethnic, or religious identity of the participants.
Second and more importantly, even if markets were able to slough off
ethnic identity, robust markets rely on a legal infrastructure that recognizes
differential power relations among participants.5 7
D. Which Minorities?
Why compare minority shareholders to minority races? Why not
compare minority shareholders to other kinds of minorities-minorities of
very tall people, minorities of the very rich, or minorities of people who
like broccoli? After all, any one of us is, by some measure, a member of a
minority group. Should not we each deserve, by my reasoning, special
protection?
The answer can be found in corporate law itself. Consider how minority
shareholders are defined in corporate law: A Texan is not a "minority
shareholder" simply because all the other shareholders are from New York.
Rather, minority status among shareholders centers on share ownership and
other indicia of control; it ignores other features that might be said logically
to describe someone who is in a minority. Instead, corporate law reflects a
concern for those who have small shareholdings, in the face of either large
shareholders or the board of directors and corporate officers. While it is
theoretically possible that New Yorkers in a corporation might gang up on
Texans or that right-handers might gang up on lefties, there is little reason
to suspect this to be the case and little history of actual oppression on such
grounds.
Corporate law chooses which kinds of minorities to protect through
experience and logic. And it chooses the label "minority" based on
shareholding and power relations within the corporation. Corporate law
thus offers a refinement to the traditional understanding of John Hart Ely's
famous liberal defense of affirmative action. For Ely, affirmative action for
African Americans lies beyond suspicion when enacted by a majority white
legislature. He writes, "There is... nothing constitutionally suspicious
256. AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2002); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 138-
41 (1992) (describing private law system among historically ethnically homogenous diamond
merchants); Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 874-
92 (1999) (describing the operations of savings and credit associations formed by immigrant
groups); Chander, Diaspora Bonds, supra note 5, at 1065-68 (describing Indian diaspora's
purchase of Indian government's Resurgent India Bonds); Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy,
and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 29-33
(1998) (identifying "market-dominant" ethnic minorities).
257. Comparative corporate governance theorists have demonstrated that minority protection
is a key element in healthy capital markets. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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about a majority's discriminating against itself. ,,258 Ely's focus on
process follows footnote four of the Carolene Products decision, in which
the Court expressed its concern with "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities" 259 who are systematically disadvantaged in the political process.
Ely's process-based jurisprudence offers a leading liberal justification for
affirmative action. It identifies the groups warranting state protection on the
basis of the political process. As Bruce Ackerman has shown, however, a
focus on process alone (without reference to substantive conditions in
society) is inadequate to the task of combating prejudice.26° Witness Justice
O'Connor's use of Ely's argument in rejecting an affirmative action
program instituted by a majority African-American city council.261
Corporate law would not make such a cursory assessment. For
corporate law, mechanical judgments (such as simple nosecounting) tell
only part of the story. Corporate law does not define "minority"
shareholders on the basis of numbers alone. Rather it undertakes a
contextual inquiry into relations of power within the corporation. Even
minority holders can exercise control of the corporation. A sample of the
results of judicial inquiries reads: "It is undisputed that the 44.4% acquired
by Flintkote represented effective control of Gable. 262 In Berger v. Berger,
a court held that even a person who held ninety-eight percent of his
company's stock could be a minority shareholder based on a "qualitative,"
not "mechanistic," assessment.263 Consider also a famous historical
episode: John D. Rockefeller "succeeded in his famous struggle to oust the
chairman of the board of Standard Oil of Indiana despite controlling only
14.9% of Standard Oil's stock.' ,264 New York's "constituency statute"
recognizes that control may be exercised even without majority ownership
of voting stock; the statute defines "control" as "the possession, directly or
indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management
and policies of the corporation, whether through the ownership of voting
stock, by contract, or otherwise. 265 Control groups in corporations quite
commonly-perhaps even usually-own less than a majority of the
stock.2 66 Owners of a plurality of the shares often exert power similar to
258. ELY, supra note 185, at 172; see also John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974).
259. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
260. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 739-40 (1985).
261. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(citing Ely for two propositions-that a white majority disadvantaging itself is not constitutionally
suspect, and that a black majority disadvantaging whites is not suspect).
262. Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (N.Y. 1979) (mem.).
263. 592 A.2d 321, 326-28 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991).
264. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 1932, supra note 41, at 4.
265. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 2003).
266. But see Coffee, supra note 56, at 397 (arguing that the prospect of control by a small
minority has become "increasingly remote" as a result of the rise of institutional investors).
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that of a true majority.267 Indeed, the American Law Institute even
presumes control on the basis of more than twenty-five percent ownership
(though the judiciary has thus far resisted reliance on quantitative rules
alone).268
The irony is that, despite Justice O'Connor's citation of Ely to the
contrary, Ely himself understands this. Indeed, he submitted a brief in
Croson (on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union) arguing exactly
this point:
The fact that racial minorities may constitute 50% of the general
population in some cities, as they do in Richmond, does not
automatically render whites a "discrete and insular minority"
invoking suspect classification analysis. Mere numerical majority
does not translate automatically into political domination. The
political strength of an identifiable group depends, inter alia, on
voting registration rates, political cohesiveness and organization,
and, of course, economic resources.26 9
Ely would have us look at the substantive conditions in society that make
certain groups more or less vulnerable to abuse through the political
process.
The constant need to assess power dynamics reflects the contingent
nature of law itself. While prominent scholars detect the end of history for
corporate law,2 70 the focus on experience that I suggest here requires a more
dynamic, even humble, attitude. As conditions change, we may find that the
minorities needing protection may change as well. As the structure of
ownership shifts from state-sanctioned monopolies to state socialism, to
family corporations, to dispersed shareholders, to oligarchs, to trusts, or to
pension funds, law must ready itself for each turn. The American Law
267. See 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS
§ 14.03, at 824-25 (2d ed. 2003) (listing myriad ways that a minority shareholder may assert
control, including agreements, veto power, and the setting of dividend schedules); Loftus C.
Carson, 1I, The Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Federal Securities Acts, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 263, 286 (1997) ("Shareholdings may provide a source of power that enables their
holder to exercise actual control, even when such holdings are less than the majority .... ").
Typically, the ability of less-than-majority holders to exercise working control rests largely on the
diffusion of the remaining shareholders. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
1932, supra note 41, at 4 ("Frequently... ownership is so widely scattered that working control
can be maintained with but a minority interest.").
268. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 34, § 1.10(b), at 14 ("A person
who, either alone or pursuant to an arrangement or understanding with one or more other persons,
owns or has the power to vote more than 25 percent of the outstanding equity securities of a
corporation is presumed to exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of the
corporation .... ")
269. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union at 12 n.7, City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1998) (No. 87-998), available at 1987 U.S. Briefs 998 (LEXIS).
270. E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
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Institute recognized this nearly a century ago: "There will never be a time
when the work is done and its results labeled 'A Complete Restatement of
the Law.' 271 The law is a work in progress; it is in permanent reform. Our
work is to keep time's arrow pointing in the direction of greater human
capability.
272
Similarly, if and when that magical moment arrives when societal and
economic conditions no longer warrant affirmative action for today's racial
minorities, law must adapt. The Supreme Court's recent enunciation of its
expectation that "25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary ''273 to foster student body diversity seems optimistic but
not entirely misdirected. While it seems unlikely that racial parity will be
achieved at any time in the near future, we must always be willing to
reconsider our efforts, especially with respect to the enumeration of the
protected classes. As power relations in society turn upside down (or in any
other direction), the beneficiaries of any affirmative action must change
accordingly.274
III. INCORPORATION
What exactly then can constitutional law learn from corporate law?
To appropriate wholesale corporate law's mechanisms for minority
protection seems unwise, mistaking metaphor for identity. Many corporate
protections are peculiar to that environment. Yet, there will also be
mechanisms that might prove relevant. Consider Lani Guinier's famous
borrowing from corporate law in her proposal for cumulative voting in
political elections. 275 Guinier's proposal simply retraced the path taken by
corporate law, now from the other direction; as we have seen, cumulative
voting in corporate law itself had roots in John Stuart Mill's classical
political liberalism.
276
271. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 34, at xxii (quoting 1923
Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement
of the Law); see also 1 id. at 200 (observing that "the duty of fair dealing" is not a "final,
complete, and unchanging concept, but rather.., a concept that will continue to evolve as new
problems and circumstances stimulate and challenge our system of corporate governance").
272. On capabilities, see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (2000); and
Amartya Sen, Rights and Capabilities, in MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY: A TRIBUTE TO J.L.
MACKIE (Ted Honderich ed., 1985).
273. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
274. For example, Margaret Jane Radin, speaking of the double bind of commodification-its
threat to personhood coupled with the possible economic advantage for the person who is the
object of commodification-suggests that we must choose whether or not to permit
commodification based on existing societal circumstances, but "we must keep re-deciding as time
goes on." Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1700
(1990).
275. E.g., Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 11, at 1437-43; Guinier, The Triumph of
Tokenism, supra note 11, at 1136-53.
276. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
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But corporate law's principal instruction may come not in technology,
but in philosophy. Corporate law teaches us how we might approach the
project of minority protection generally. In this final Part, I apply
corporate lessons about minority protection to the project of racial equality.
I consider three contemporary civil rights debates--each a contemporary
flashpoint-centering on the issue of affirmative action.
A. Grutter and Gratz
Consider first the highly charged issue before the Supreme Court in its
last Term: the validity of race-based affirmative action programs in higher
education. The cases of Grutter v. Bollinger
2 77 and Gratz v. Bollinger
2 78
tested the constitutionality of racial preferences in law school and
undergraduate admissions, respectively, at the prestigious University of
Michigan at Ann Arbor. White applicants denied admission challenged (1)
the law school's policy of, inter alia, seeking to maintain a "critical mass"
of "students from groups which have been historically discriminated
against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans,, 279 and
(2) the college's policy of awarding a significant number of "plus points" in
the admissions process to members of these same groups. The plaintiffs
argued that the University's admissions programs violated the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection, which they understood to require identical
treatment of all applicants.280 The University of Michigan replied that an
adverse ruling would precipitate "the immediate resegregation" of this
country's finest educational institutions.281
Grutter, Gratz, and the other plaintiffs saw in the cases the opportunity
to further the journey upon which the Supreme Court had seemed to
embark-toward the utopia of governmental colorblindness. In its recent
decisions prior to Grutter and Gratz, the Court had moved definitively, if
not steadily,282 toward a colorblind model. It has traveled from Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, which demanded a "'most searching
examination"' of any racial preference, 28 3 to City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., which rejected evidence of past societal discrimination as too
277. 123 S. Ct. 2325.
278. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
279. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332 (internal quotation marks omitted).
280. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Grutter (No. 02-241) (arguing that the issue is
"whether our Nation's principles of equal protection and non-discrimination mean the same thing
for all races").
281. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Grutter (No. 02-241).
282. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
283. 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448,491 (1980)).
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general to establish a compelling state interest in a racial preference, 284 to
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, which required the same level of
scrutiny for a preference, regardless of "'the race of those burdened or
benefited"' 285 or the "good intentions" 286 of its proponents.
The ideology of governmental colorblindness does not deny the
persistence of difference within the polity. Rather it proposes that law must
ignore such difference, lest it become complicit in its perpetuation. But
consider an early formulation of the colorblind principle, articulated by the
elder Justice Harlan, dissenting, in Plessy v. Ferguson:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth
and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it
remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class
of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-
blind... 287
Justice Harlan's entreaty to the "white race" reveals the studied ignorance
that law must affect if it adopts the mandate of colorblindness. Despite the
white race's apparent superior position-a position that Justice Harlan
hoped would be perpetual-law should not notice racial difference.
In Grutter and Gratz, the Court did not adopt the principle of
governmental colorblindness. Indeed, Grutter specifically reaffirmed the
ability of the state to consider the race of students in higher education
admissions, even to establish a "critical mass" of minority students. Yet,
despite affirming race consciousness, the Court resisted recognizing the
principal basis for race consciousness: the fact that power and race are
closely intertwined in contemporary society. The Court only fleetingly
acknowledged "our Nation's struggle with racial inequality. '288 In a sense
284. 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (plurality opinion).
285. 515 U.S. at 222 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality opinion)).
286. Id. at 228.
287. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) Justice Harlan's statement that
"[tihere is no caste here" seems to assume that caste must be legally sanctioned. But if society
severely circumscribes occupational opportunities based on one's parents' socioeconomic status, a
kind of caste system emerges, whether or not it is sanctioned by law. Additionally, despite Justice
Harlan's insistence on colorblindness, he observes without criticism the law's exclusion of
members of the Chinese race: "There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit
those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few
exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race." Id. at 561
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
288. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2344 (2003); see also id. at 2341 (observing that
our society is one "in which race unfortunately still matters").
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then, the Court followed Justice Harlan's mandate to avoid notice of
existing conditions of superiority and inferiority.
Rather than focusing on societal conditions that necessitate affirmative
action, the Court embraced the goal of fostering student body diversity.
2 89
Diversity is a powerful idea, a means to strengthen not just investment
portfolios, but also institutions. Diversity holds promise as a basis for
supporting affirmative action programs, not just in education, but also in
employment and in distributing governmental largesse. Justice Scalia
recognized as much in his dissent in Grutter, suggesting that,
[i]f it is appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to
use racial discrimination for the purpose of putting together a
"critical mass" that will convey generic lessons in socialization and
good citizenship, surely it is no less appropriate-indeed,
particularly appropriate-for the civil service system of the State of
Michigan to do so.
29 °
Indeed, the Supreme Court had already relied on diversity to justify a
federal minority preference program in the transfer of broadcast licenses.29'
Yet, the failure to recognize the operation of power leaves
governmental action to protect racial minorities on a relatively weak
footing. This failure limits the subtlety of governmental programs, which
must now focus broadly on fostering a rainbow of views, rather than
redressing directly conditions of inequality. It also offers a weaker sense of
justice. Consider Justice Scalia's sarcastic description of the results of
affirmative action: "The nonminority individuals who are deprived of a
legal education, a civil service job, or any job at all by reason of their skin
color will surely understand, ' 292 he writes. Justice Scalia's concern seems
reasonable: After all, how can one appreciate the need for affirmative action
in any context without a strong consciousness of discrimination in
289. Id. at 2338 (upholding the law school's affirmative action program, which seeks to
"obtain[] the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
290. Id. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). By this example, Justice
Scalia hoped to show that the diversity rationale justifies too much governmental race
consciousness.
291. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). While the Court in Metro Broadcasting
scrutinized that program less searchingly than demanded by the Court's later opinion in Adarand,
515 U.S. at 226-27, it remains an open question whether the diversity rationale might offer a
compelling governmental interest justifying the broadcast license program.
292. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia's reference to the "nonminority individual" is incorrect: He meant to refer to individuals
who do not benefit directly from affirmative action; affirmative action programs often exclude
some racial minority groups-principally Asians-from their benefits.
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society? 293 Not only might certain individuals feel wronged, but, more
fundamentally, the judiciary might fail to recognize the role of law in
constructing equality.
Corporate law, as we have seen, seeks a much richer informational base
upon which to form its judgments. Rather than studied ignorance, it
explicitly examines who is in control and who is a minority susceptible of
exploitation. It meticulously examines power, and learns from experience
with power's operation. Its structure is elaborately designed to protect
minority shareholders against the wrongdoing of controlling shareholders or
management. Where the Supreme Court has at times demanded an exacting
demonstration of individualized history of disadvantage before permitting
special protection,294 corporate law eschews any demand for such a
historical record before imposing its specialized obligations. It assumes that
minorities are at risk of unfair treatment, and acts accordingly.
Furthermore, while critics decry what they see as the stigmatizing effect
of affirmative action and the racial "paternalism '295 it reveals, no such
stigma attaches to minority shareholders, despite corporate law's substantial
protections. The need for minority shareholder protection does not impugn
the capacity or honor of minority shareholders. The minority shareholder is
not described as incompetent because she could not negotiate sufficient
protections for herself. Rather, such protections are understood as necessary
given the power relations within the firm. Perhaps one can sensibly
understand affirmative action as a similar response. Given societal
circumstances, affirmative action might be due to individuals whose lack of
power makes them more vulnerable to the unequal distribution of
educational and economic opportunities. Instead of stigmatizing certain
racial minorities as less worthy recipients of governmental largesse, we
might better understand affirmative action as akin more to fiduciary duties
and securities regulation-as yet another device to protect those vulnerable
to exploitation.
Most importantly, if the elaborate edifice of minority shareholder
protection is justified by concerns for fairness or capital formation, it seems
appropriate to ask if such concerns might not also justify protections for
minority races. Corporate law, as we have seen, promotes capital formation
and fairness by taking into account power relations within an institution. 96
293. Justice Ginsburg's forthright recognition that "[iln the wake 'of a system of racial caste
only recently ended,' large disparities endure" stands in sharp contrast to the tenor of the Court's
own opinion. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2443 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 273 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)).
294. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-508 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
295. E.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
296. See supra Section H.A.
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I argue that these same two fundamental goals should also be well served
by legal protections for minority races.
Racial minorities in the United States face discrimination from cradle to
grave. A principal result of antidiscrimination laws is that discrimination is
now hidden, operating in ways that are difficult to specify. Based on
empirical studies, Ian Ayres concludes that in a variety of markets from
car sales to kidney transplants-blacks and women are consistently at a
disadvantage.297 The Supreme Court has recognized the persistence of racial
discrimination, even while denying a basis for affirmative action. As Justice
O'Connor acknowledged for the Court in Adarand, "The unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate
reality ... 298
Economic analysis finds such discrimination inefficient. Gary Becker's
seminal work on the economics of employment discrimination suggests that
competitive markets would, on their own, eliminate discrimination because
of its inefficiency. 299 The discriminating producer, Becker argues, would be
driven from the market. Kenneth Arrow observes the irony in Becker's
theory, which "predicts the absence of the phenomenon it was designed to
explain., 30 Arrow himself suggests an alternative explanation: Because the
productivity of prospective workers is not directly observable, employers
might rely on proxies for productivity. 30 ' If race serves as such a proxy, and
if whites on average are more productive than minorities because of
educational or other advantages, then employers might hire based on race-
in spite of the high (but unobservable) qualifications of any individual
minority person. Statistical discrimination is especially pernicious because
it is self-fulfilling: "If the employer is going to judge by race, then there is
297. IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 19, 165 (2001).
298. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237. Adarand's concession that discrimination persists now
contrasts with the Court's earlier statement in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, which
conceded only that discrimination has existed in the past, without admitting its continuing role in
society. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("No one
doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country."); see also Croson, 488
U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion) (noting the "sorry history of both private and public
discrimination").
299. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957).
300. Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Mathematical Models of Race Discrimination in the Labor
Market, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION N ECONOMIC LIFE 187, 192 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972).
301. But after some three decades of study, Arrow has now concluded that discrimination
may persist, despite its inefficiencies, because of nonmarket factors. See Kenneth J. Arrow, What
Has Economics To Say About Racial Discrimination?, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 91, 93.
Noneconomic motivations for discrimination might include a desire for group status production,
with individuals making material sacrifices (in the form of inefficient production) for group
welfare. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1009-19 (1995).
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no reward for... [human capital] investments. '" 30 2 With minorities no
longer investing in education, the statistical discriminator will over time
have her discriminatory instinct confirmed.
The major economic theories of discrimination all share a central
belief-racial discrimination in employment harms economic production.
They differ only on its etiology and on the appropriate remedy. While a few
scholars such as Richard Epstein and Richard Posner argue that state
intervention to eliminate discrimination is unwise, 30 3 others maintain that
legal intervention can help ameliorate the distorting effects of
discrimination. John Donohue has argued that legal intervention to
eliminate discrimination increases efficiency faster than the self-correcting
processes of the market.3 °4 Affirmative action to promote minority
employment should help counter the pernicious effects of racism on
productivity, producing a larger, more capable work force. In general,
affirmative action in employment should help the goal of capital
formation. °5
The same is true of education. The economic analysis of investments in
human capital supports the need for affirmative action in education.
Becker's work in "human capital" demonstrates the important role that
education plays in productivity as reflected in income.3 °6 Orley Ashenfelter
and Cecilia Rouse establish that better-educated people have higher
incomes, even taking into account differences in so-called innate ability.3 °7
An economy that has more well-trained workers would seem to be better
positioned for growth. Affirmative action both in education and
employment might help end the "poverty trap '3°8 into which many minority
families appear to fall, allowing them to become more economically
productive members of society.
302. Arrow, supra note 301, at 96-97; see also John J. Donohue 1I1, Further Thoughts on
Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523,
532-33 (1987).
303. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII,
136 U. PA. L. REv. 513 (1987). Their argument would oddly permit private discrimination against
minorities, but prohibit public action on minorities' behalf.
304. Donohue, supra note 302, at 532-33 (citing John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?,
134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411 (1986)).
305. I do not mean to hold affirmative action hostage to the ruthless machine of efficiency,
but rather to show that our interests in the two are likely to coincide. That said, if an affirmative
action program proves inefficient, we should revise it to improve its utility-generating effects.
306. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 17 (3d ed. 1993) (concluding that "high school and
college education in the United States greatly raise a person's income").
307. Orley Ashenfelter & Cecilia Rouse, Schooling, Intelligence, and Income in America, in
MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 5, at 89.
308. Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Inequality and Race: Models and Policy, in
MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 5, at 269, 280 (describing "poverty
traps" in which groups may be perpetually caught through accidents of history).
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Indeed, a number of the nation's Fortune 500 companies, including
many household names, declared to the Supreme Court their strong interest
in continuing affirmative action in higher education. In a brief in support of
the University of Michigan in Grutter and Gratz, these companies argued
that a workforce, both educated within an ethnically diverse environment
and itself ethnically diverse, offers substantial advantages in an ethnically
diverse national and global economy. 30 9 These companies also emphasized
the breadth of the population they serve, noting, for example, that "[a]micus
Procter and Gamble sold a branded product to more than 2.5 billion people
across the world last year."310 Surely it is useful to employ a diverse
workforce to sell to such a diverse population. But while the brief was
correct in identifying affirmative action as useful in hiring a racially diverse
workforce, it left undisturbed the underlying notion of white superiority.
The brief implies that nonwhites might be good employees because they
can help sell products to other nonwhites. It never squarely says what the
economic theory we have reviewed above suggests-that bringing
additional groups into the workforce for highly skilled labor will improve
the quality of the workforce overall. Not only will minorities add to the
ability to sell to other nonwhite consumers, but they will also improve the
quality of the product, the design of the factory, the beauty of the
promotional materials, and the strategy for sales. Affirmative action at the
University of Michigan and other educational institutions draws groups into
the workforce for corporate America, increasing the talent pool from which
it can draw. Corporate law, too, we have seen, ensures minority protection
in part because of its desire to obtain minority participation in the capitalist
enterprise, thereby improving the enterprise through the additional capital
contributed by the minority.
This argument about capital formation and fairness has avoided the
language of constitutional law in favor of consequentialist, policy-oriented
arguments. But, of course, the constitutional jurisprudence of affirmative
action itself turns on these types of arguments-from concerns about a
debilitating "stigma" to broader notions of societal progress.31 1 The policy
arguments I have suggested here respond directly to those of affirmative
action's opponents. Stigmatization is revealed as inappropriate when
governmental intervention responds to the abuse of power, and societal
progress seems more likely through broader availability of the most
prestigious institutions of higher education. But we can go farther yet. We
309. Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241). The companies include many of
America's household names, including both Coca-Cola and Pepsi, as well as Alcoa, American
Airlines, General Electric, Kellogg, Kraft, Merck, Microsoft, Procter & Gamble, Reebok, Sara
Lee, Shell Oil, United Airlines, Whirlpool, and Xerox.
310. Id. at 7.
311. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 446-48 (1997).
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have seen that judges considering corporate cases review structural reasons
for unfairness-from dispersed shareholding to in-group biases among
independent directors-instead of requiring purely individualized showings
of disadvantage and oppression. Such structural concerns would plainly
prove helpful in the constitutional context as well.
As I have shown, a general concern with capital formation and fairness
might often lead us to adopt affirmative action programs in employment
and education, just as we do in corporate law on behalf of minority
shareholders.312 If structural subordination is the problem, it must be
addressed directly by laws that acknowledge it. In such conditions, Lady
Justice must take off her blindfold.313
B. The Racial Blindness Initiative
Consider a new constitutional initiative from my home state of
California-being put to the electorate as this Essay goes to press-which
promises to be as divisive as Proposition 209.314 The new initiative, which I
call the "Racial Blindness Initiative, '315 would prevent the government
from collecting information about race, thus carrying the banner of
colorblindness to its logical conclusion.
This initiative would force racial indifference on state government by
preventing it from gathering racial information-in employment, in
education, and in law enforcement. 316 Of course, government workers could
secretly still make personal assessments of race-based on appearance,
speech, domicile, and name. Rather, the measure would find its significance
in denying the government any systematic ability to engage in affirmative
action. At the same time, it would deny minorities the factual record that
would facilitate claims for police harassment and governmental redlining. It
312. See supra Section II.A.
313. Despite the Court's failure to acknowledge forthrightly the role of power, the Court's
opinion in Grutter does offer the seeds of a more robust jurisprudence. Writing for the Court,
Justice O'Connor acknowledged the role of universities as the "training ground for ... our
Nation's leaders" and the need for "all members of our heterogeneous society [to] participate in
the educational institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in
America." Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341. This recognition offers a foundation not just for
diversifying student bodies, but also for a more active program of promoting minorities.
314. Proposition 209 amended the California Constitution to ban preferential treatment in
public hiring, contracting, and school admissions. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 ("The state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting.").
315. Proposition 54, Classification by Race, Ethnicity, Color, or National Origin (certified
Cal. 2003) (to be enacted as CAL. CONST. art. l, § 32), at http://voterguide.ss.ca.gov/
propositions/2-3-prop-54.html [hereinafter Racial Blindness Initiative].
316. The government would also not be able to collect racial information with respect to any
other functions, except where the legislature approved an exception by two-thirds of each house
and the Governor signed it. Id. § 32(b) (to be enacted as CAL. CONST. art. I, § 32(b)).
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would no longer be possible to determine if government actions carried
discriminatory impacts. The measure would also likely moot Supreme
Court rulings on the constitutionality of affirmative action, at least with
respect to actions by the State of California. 317 Furthermore, like
Proposition 209 before it, the Initiative aspires to be a model for similar
grassroots action throughout the United States.
We might reflect on this initiative by imagining a similar initiative in
the corporate context. Call this hypothetical proposal the "Shareholder
Blindness Initiative." This measure would deny the law access to
information about the stake that any particular shareholder had in the
corporation. Rather than viewing each shareholder differently according to
control or minority status, all shareholders would be treated the same. Bill
Gates, Warren Buffett, and the small pensioner are all rendered equal-by
law, if not in fact.
In our real world, however, corporate law does not adopt an approach
of formal equality, refusing to recognize differences among shareholders.
Corporate law does not confuse equality with sameness. Indeed, corporate
law even goes so far as to impose special duties on controlling shareholders
and managers that are not borne by minority shareholders. Corporate law
recognizes what this initiative would deny: In order to do justice, law must
keep in mind the identity of the individuals involved-specifically, whether
they are controlling or minority members of the relevant group.
Of course, states have long employed racial classification as a tool for
subjugation. In fact, such state efforts helped produce our modem
understandings of race.318 The apparatus of identification is a necessary
precondition to the operation of domination. Benedict Anderson writes of
the use of census categories by the colonial state in Southeast Asia:
"Guided by its imagined map [the colonial state] organized the new
educational, juridical, public-health, police, and immigration bureaucracies
it was building on the principle of ethno-racial hierarchies ... ,3 19 Even the
Racial Blindness Initiative would preserve the ability of the state to engage
317. Cf Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193-95 (9th Cir. 2000)
(observing that a suit challenging an affirmative action program at a state law school would be
moot because a Washington State constitutional initiative-modeled on California's Proposition
209-had already prohibited any racial preference in education).
318. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (1996); see also Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the
Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism, 81 CAL. L. REv. 863, 879-85 (1993) (addressing
the tension of separatism and conflict in an immigration-driven and multicultural society); Kevin
R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 292-96
(2000) (responding to the question of whether there is a plenary power doctrine); Spencer
Overton, Voices from the Past: Race, Privilege, and Campaign Finance, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1541,
1544-52 (2001) (analyzing the role of race and privilege in campaign finance).
319. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 169 (1991).
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in racial identification for "law enforcement" purposes. 320 But a tragic
history of employing race as a device for targeted oppression should not
lead us now to reject state knowledge of race when employed to achieve
justice. Given the coincidence of the distribution of power with racial
identity in our society, the state would handicap itself severely by refusing
to recognize the race of its citizens in its efforts to achieve social justice.
C. A Majority of Minorities
Finally, consider the coming demographic shift-already reality in
California 32 '-where minority races make up a majority of the
population.322 With this shift, we will see the emergence of the argument
that, even if minorities once needed legal protection, they no longer deserve
special protection because they now are in the majority. After all, why
should the law worry about protecting the majority of the population from
subjugation by the minority?3 23 Indeed, should not law protect whites from
the majority of other races? In rejecting an affirmative action program in
employment, Justice O'Connor noted that it was devised by a majority
African-American city council.324
But juxtapose this recent statement from a state supreme court:
"[N]otwithstanding its 43.3 percent minority... interest, [one party] did
exercise control over [another party] by dominating its... affairs.,
325 This
statement, of course, arose in a corporate setting; the specific reference is to
a controlling shareholder-Alcatel-that violated its duties to the small
investors in the corporation, even though it held but a minority of the
shares. Corporate law understands that control does not require strict
numerical advantage, though numbers certainly help.
6 It makes more
320. Racial Blindness Initiative § 32(g) (to be enacted as CAL. CONST. art. I, § 32(g))
("Nothing in this section shall prevent law enforcement officers, while carrying out their law
enforcement duties, from describing particular persons in otherwise lawful ways.").
321. CAL. DEP'T OF FIN., CALIFORNIA CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY REPORT: MARCH
2002 DATA 1 (2003) (reporting that non-Hispanic whites were 45.7% of California's population in
March 2002), at www.dof.ca.gov/html/demograp/cps-2002.pdf.
322. The United States Census Bureau projects that non-Hispanic whites will fall out of the
majority by the middle of this century. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROJECTIONS OF THE RESIDENT
POPULATION BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1999 TO 2100 (2000).
323. One possible answer might come from work in public choice, which recognizes the
possibility that mobilized interest groups in a democracy might be able to capture political
decisionmaking even in the absence of majority support.
324. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
325. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994).
326. See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989)
('[A] shareholder who owns less than 50% of a corporation's outstanding stocks does not,
without more, become a controlling shareholder of that corporation, with a concomitant fiduciary
status.' For a dominating relationship to exist in the absence of controlling stock ownership, a
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nuanced assessments of actual relations of power within the corporate
hierarchy. 327 Even those holding thirty-five percent of the shares might
make ninety-five percent of the decisions. Indeed, corporate law usually
prefers to speak in terms of minority and controlling shareholders, not
minority and majority shareholders.
My point is well made by the Fifth Circuit, in a 2000 decision that
explicitly considered minorities and majorities: "[T]he question of minority
versus majority should not focus on mechanical mathematical calculations,
but instead, 'The question is whether they have the power to work their will
on others ... ,,,328 Ironically, in Hopwood v. Texas, the same court had
dramatically rejected the affirmative action program of the University of
Texas School of Law.
329
Reliance on numerical disadvantage alone to identify vulnerable groups
will prove both over- and underinclusive. Such a simplistic rule would seek
to protect men from women, as women outnumber men. 330 This formalist
procedural view mistakes number for power.33' Corporate law, on the other
hand, does not find it at all surprising that majorities may not command
power commensurate with their number.332 Corporate law recognizes that
control may follow from other resources. Indeed, the feminist focus on
plaintiff must allege domination by a minority shareholder through actual control of corporate
conduct." (quoting Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1984))).
327. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 647 (describing methods whereby block holders of
equity outside the United States often exercise control of a corporation without having majority
ownership of that corporation); Deborah A. DeMott, The Mechanisms of Control, 13 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 233, 235-51 (1999) (illustrating many forms of control in relationships between
corporations); Mary Siegel, The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 27, 34 (1999) ("There is no set percentage of stock that will automatically place a
minority shareholder under the fiduciary rubric. The key factor is the ability to dictate the terms of
a transaction.").
328. Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 466 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d
119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996)).
329. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir.), vacated by 95 F.3d 53 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
330. In this example, a numerical rule would be simultaneously overinclusive because it
would posit men as a class to be protected from women and underinclusive because it would deny
women any heightened scrutiny of gender classifications.
331. Dissenting from the Supreme Court's decision to bar Virginia's all-male military
academy, Justice Scalia offered this process-based explanation for why women should not deserve
heightened judicial solicitude. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (declaring that women are not a "'discrete and insular minorit[y]' unable to employ
the 'political processes' (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4,
(1938) (alteration in original))). The Court's embrace of heightened scrutiny for gender
discriminations, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33, suggests that the Court is not wholly blind to
the vulnerability of women despite their majority status, though the Court's gender discrimination
jurisprudence offers a formally equal concern for both men and women. See, e.g., J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
332. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 1967, supra note 41, at 75-84
(describing situations in which persons holding majority of shares do not exercise control over a
corporation).
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domination 333 can be seen as a parallel move. Corporate law understands
this lack of symmetry between votes and control as a collective action
problem, but additional factors such as false consciousness 334 or the multi-
issue nature of voting335 may explain this feature of political life. For law to
rely on nosecounting alone to identify who is vulnerable in society would
be for law to fail to recognize the more subtle operation of power within
and across groups.
CONCLUSION
"[M]en are described as I think they are," Adolf Berle writes of his
work, "rather than as they think they are."336 He continues: "Some will be
shocked. The businessman will find that he is a politician and a
commissar-perhaps even a revolutionary one. The liberal finds himself a
traditionalist. '337 My juxtaposition of the corporate lawyer and the
progressive activist may strike both as surprising and even uncomfortable.
But corporate law has long been described as the constitutional law for the
economic state. 338 Both corporate law and constitutional law seek to order
relations between heterogeneous persons who hold stakes in a shared
enterprise. Yet the parallels between the two have rarely been fully drawn.
In this paper, I have begun to sketch the unexplored but immanent
connections in the two domains.
That the word "minority" is critical in both constitutional law and
corporate law is not mere lexical coincidence. Much of life is affected by
one's minority or nonminority status. On my reinterpretation, corporate law
offers the same insight as critical scholarship: Law must take into account
relations of domination and subordination. Corporate law already does this.
Equal protection jurisprudence, at least as currently promulgated by the
Supreme Court, denies it. But if there is to be a kind of grand unifying
333. See supra notes 210-211 and accompanying text.
334. E.g., Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1665
(1997) (describing the social construction of a vision of good). But see ELY, supra note 185,
at 165-67 (critiquing the suggestion that a "mistaken choice" should lead us to distrust
majority judgment).
335. ELY, supra note 185, at 164 (noting that voters are "typically confronted not with single-
issue referenda but rather with packages of attitudes, packages we call candidates").
336. BERLE, supra note 197, at 3.
337. Id.; cf BERLE, POWER, supra note 198, at 578 ("The modem corporation, oddly enough,
is an unintended revolutionary instrument.").
338. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 1932, supra note 41, at 357 ("The
law of corporations... might well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new
economic state .... "); Branson, supra note 241, at 621 ("Corporate law is like constitutional law
with a small 'c.' . . Just as the Bill of Rights protects minorities from the tyranny of the majority,
corporate law sets limits upon how far a majority may impose its will upon the minority.");
Thompson, supra note 165, at 1 ("In corporations, the most common collective entity in the
private sphere, a parallel allocation [of power as in the public sphere] must be made. In this sense,
corporate law is properly termed constitutional law.").
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theory of corporate and constitutional law, it will turn on this insight
about power.
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